

The NCO Journal


Winter 1992

A Quarterly Forum for Professional Development



SOUTHWEST ASIA
SERVICE

Combat



Boots of the NCO

In battledress, the NCO wears boots. He always has. Well, almost. Many soldiers at Valley Forge did not have shoes, much less boots. They marched and fought with no more than rags that were wrapped around bleeding, frost-bitten feet. Those volunteers literally knew the meaning of a “come as you are” war.

From the crude, rough and soiled moccasins worn by soldiers 200 years ago, to the smooth and polished jump or jungle boots of today, boots have been basic to soldiering. Whether strapped, laced, buttoned, buckled or wrapped by leggings, boots have marched, paced, sloshed, trampled, jumped and charged over or through dirt, mud, snow, brush, rock, sand and water.

In peace and war, the boots of the American soldier have left their prints in many places — Yorktown, Little Big Horn, Shiloh, San Juan Hill, Luzon, Cantigny and Koblenz, Omaha Beach and Iwo Jima, Inchon, Kae Sanh, St. George’s, the Sinai and Gander, Panama City and Kuwait City, to name but a few.

With boots on, U.S. soldiers have fought wars, policed cities, stood between hostile forces, provided humanitarian relief, rescued civilians . . . and died. Boots have been buried with soldiers, removed from bodies, amputated along with legs and shattered by mines.

No matter where, or when, or what the mission, an Army NCO was there . . . wearing boots.

Anonymous

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The **NCO Journal** is a professional publication for noncommissioned officers of the U.S. Army. Views expressed herein are those of the authors. Views and contents do not necessarily reflect the official Army or Department of Defense positions and do not change or supersede information in other official publications.

Our mission is to provide a forum for the open exchange of ideas and information, to support training, education and development of the NCO Corps, and to foster a closer bond among its members.

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Letters: Letters to the editor are encouraged. They must be signed and include the writer's full name and rank, city and state (or city and country) and mailing address. Letters should be brief and are subject to editing.

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Top Officer

Visiting units in VII Corps after the operation that made up our part of Desert Storm, I talked to many quality soldiers and asked why our Army had performed so well. Almost every soldier told me two important things. They all stated that their training was critical in preparing them for the unknowns of combat, and they praised the sergeants who had ensured they were ready for battle.

Soldiers place great trust in their leaders — particularly their sergeants — to ensure they are prepared to fight and win. Soldiers know when they are being taken care of by being properly trained, when their welfare is a priority and when their leaders have their best interests at heart. This is a reflection of the competence and abilities of the NCOs the soldier sees; not just those in the soldier's immediate chain of command, but those who make up the NCO structure in a unit. When NCOs conduct relevant and demanding training and ensure soldiers meet training, maintenance and appearance standards, soldiers rise to the occasion. Proud soldiers and battle-effective teams develop.

There are other spin-offs as well. When NCOs ensure their soldiers are meeting the standards — properly training on the tasks that the soldier and the unit is expected to execute in combat in a tough, realistic and competitive environment — officers will let NCOs do their job. Since entering the Army, my ears have always perked at the suggestion that NCOs are not being allowed to train their soldiers the way they deem necessary — to conduct "sergeant's business." Soldiers deal with sergeants. Sergeants execute. Officers need to allow NCOs to execute, and they need to hold NCOs accountable for proper execution of the assigned task. In my experience, I have always found NCOs more than willing to assume *more* responsibility. Our units were better prepared to fight and win because of the trust between the officer and the NCO.

I saw this firsthand as the VII Corps commander in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm: officers at meetings, planning training and combat operations; sergeants executing — an unbeatable combination of leadership, responsibility and trust. And NCOs were always asking for more. Before deployment, NCOs ensured each soldier's family was taken care of, each soldier had the equipment required and each soldier was prepared — mentally, physically, emotionally — for the duties he or she was about to

perform. Just prior to battle, NCOs trained their soldiers to a razor-sharp edge of readiness, ensured their soldiers focused on fieldcraft in the demanding and unforgiving desert environment and conducted rigorous pre-combat checks on personnel, equipment and vehicles. During combat, NCOs were out among the soldiers, always leading from the front; leading the attack on the battlefield, pushing supplies forward day and night, taking care of their soldiers, providing the glue for the team. When the fighting was over, NCOs were in the lead, guiding their soldiers who turned their talents to providing the humanitarian relief efforts in occupied Iraq.

While Desert Storm showed us some early glimpses of warfare at different levels of speed, lethality and space that we had never seen before, it also reinforced for me the unquestioned value of NCO leadership to the success of the U.S. Army. Our competent, confident, tough NCOs make a difference. When leaders conduct tough, realistic training, ensure soldiers meet required standards, incorporate soldiers into a unit team and include spouses and children into the unit family, then we are watching out for the welfare of the troops. The NCO is the linchpin to all of this.

We have a battle-tested NCO Corps. Veterans. NCOs who prepared their soldiers. Who built teamwork. Who put the spotlight on the led, not the leaders. Who were heroes in battle, in moving combat support, in port operations, in the hospitals. Those who did not deploy, but would have had they been asked, contributed by continuing to train our soldiers and run mobilization centers to the ready if they were needed. All leaders, all part of the team.

The current NCO Corps is the product of wise decisions over the past 20 years in training and leader development, like our NCO Education System, then developed in our units in innovative programs like "sergeant's time." We must sustain the excellence and relevance of our NCO training and leader development so that we can maintain the battlefield edge during these rapidly changing times. On any future battlefield, this will be as important as it was during Desert Storm, and as it has always been. NCOs must remain, as they are now, the backbone of our Army.

Frederick M. Franks Jr.
Commanding General, TRADOC

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■ Cover:

Frederick Carter's oil painting captures the NCO's progressive and consistent role in defending our freedoms.

■ Inside Front Cover:

Illustration by retired CSM Gary Boggs.

■ Centerfold:

The Samurai, by Frank Hughes.

■ Inside Back Cover:

John Paul Jones' watercolor commemorates the 50th anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. It shows an Army Air Corps NCO instinctively defending Wheeler Field.

Top NCO

From the very beginning, as set down in the duties and responsibilities of the NCO in the 1779 printing of the **Blue Book**, selection of soldiers for NCO positions was and will remain serious business. After all, the NCO is the "backbone" of our Army.

Even at the beginning of our corps' proud history, the NCO was expected to instruct soldiers in the techniques of warfare, individual skills and expected behavior. Baron von Steuben saw that drill and ceremony practice was the foundation for battle drills. The same is true today. Pride, honor and loyalty were just a few of the characteristics that the NCO instilled in every soldier. Standards of military conduct were not compromised.

On the battlefield, the NCO was to close gaps in the attack line caused by fallen comrades. Leading from the front, directing men as the soldiers drew closer to the enemy, was the only accepted standard. The decision of victory depended on the soldier's trust that he was trained and ready, that his sergeant had prepared with him to face the fight and that his sergeant was professionally capable to lead under these conditions as in any other. Self-discipline would force the soldier across obstacles that in another time would seem impossible because, close by, the NCO was leading from the front.

From those first great victories to the present, the focus of the NCO has not changed. The sergeants throughout the Army — across the world — stand ready to close the gap and lead from the front. Yet, today, after several recent victories — Grenada's Urgent Fury, Panama's Just Cause and Southwest Asia's Desert Shield and Desert Storm — the NCO Corps, both deployed and standing ready to deploy, never failed to meet the challenges of combat or supporting combat operations. Today, even more than in the past when our Army was much larger, we stand ready as an Army — a combat team working together — to deploy in more than one direction and to win.

The future is unknown to us, and that is OK as long as we are a total Army with one standard. With the current force reduction of our Army, the NCO Corps must understand how each component will join together. This has worked in the past and it will work in the future.

Our NCOs — active, Guard and Reserve — must understand our "lanes"! We must train soldiers on their individual tasks to the Army's standard. Individual training is our lane; it is our job; it is one of the NCO's greatest responsibilities. Preparing for the next fight builds confidence; and this is taking care of soldiers. Remember: It is the soldier who closes on the battlefield and wins the fight. NCOs should not worry about which terrain feature to place the fighting position; focus on the fighting position. The growth of our soldiers is the future of our Army. It is the soldier today who will become the sergeant of tomorrow.

Give your soldiers the skills to win: Don't cut corners; know your job, sergeant . . . a lot depends on it! The Army's authority closest to a soldier is a sergeant. A good sergeant can't lead from the shadows; the sergeant must lead from the front.

R.B. Cayton

Command Sergeant Major III Corps

News and Issues

USASMA Initiatives

The Sergeants Major Academy will conduct a pilot course for spouses of new CSMs, study a concept for a single Sergeant Major Course class a year and look at increasing the classloads for the Battle Staff NCO Course.

The pilot course for spouses of CSMs will be similar to training for spouses of officers attending precommand courses at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. Training will address family support groups, trauma in units, leadership and the CSM, and Army issues.

A single SMC class each year would reflect projected cuts in sergeants major ranks and also include a review of the current selection process for promotion and attendance at the SMC.

An increase in BSNCOOC attendance will be studied to ensure that enough graduates are available to support the Army's needs. That review will also look at resources needed to support an increase in students.

FSC Dates Change

Dates have changed for Class 8-92 of the First Sergeant Course at Fort Bliss, Texas. That class is now scheduled to begin Oct. 5 and graduate Nov. 6.

EREC Via Touch-Tone

- A touch-tone telephone is all you need to:
- Request a microfiche copy of your official personnel file.
 - Check on documents for a centralized selection board.
 - Check on an NCO-ER.
 - Check on an updated photo.
- The Enlisted Records and Evaluation Center at Fort Harrison, Ind., uses a computerized Interactive Voice Response System — IVRS — to quickly and easily let callers check their files. IVRS can be reached by calling DSN 699-3714 or commercial (317) 512-3714.

A recording asks a caller to enter his social security number and gives further instructions for getting the desired information. The option for requesting a copy of your OMPF was scheduled to begin in late 1991. But, because these files are sent only to a caller's unit of assignment, soldiers should request an OMPF at least 90 days after PCS or more than 90 days before PCS, or the file will probably be sent to a former unit.

Larry Hibbs
Enlisted Records and Evaluation Center

Future Journal Themes

The Spring 1992 NCO Journal will be devoted to professional development. While many articles for that issue will be addressed by personnel experts, NCOs are invited to share their experiences, insights and ideas on this subject.

The Summer 1992 issue will be devoted to the NCO in the year 2000. This subject is especially suited for ideas from NCOs.

Contributors are reminded that submissions should apply to all NCOs, rather than specific branches. Contributors are also encouraged to write or call the Journal to discuss their ideas.

Rank Titles Stressed

Ranks — and not paygrades — are the proper way to address soldiers, the Army's top officer and top NCO stressed in a November message to the field.

Whether speaking or writing, grades will be accepted only when required on certain documents, GEN Gordon R. Sullivan and SMA Richard A. Kidd said in their message.

"As professional soldiers, our proud heritage and traditions must be maintained in our everyday military courtesies," the message said. "A soldier's rank identifies the position of responsibility and the level of authority attained. Use of a soldier's rank is an act of courtesy and respect due every soldier in the United States Army."

Guardian Award Unclaimed

Many soldiers do not know about a DOD safety award that recognizes ground-related actions.

The Guardian Award for extraordinary actions in an emergency recognizes soldiers who: prevent imminent danger, minimize or prevent damage to Army property, or prevent personnel injury.

Guidelines for the award are spelled out in AR 672-74. Safety and recognizing deserving soldiers are NCO business. Ironically, no soldier has ever received the Guardian Award.

SGM David Kuhns
Army Safety Center

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Combat engineers train during the early days of World War II.

The Bottom Line:

NCO Peacetime Role Preserves Combat Readiness

By SGM Bill Lopez

Combat is the bottom line. It is the ultimate test of our professionalism — a literal “do or die” test; possibly a “do *and* die” test.

This issue is devoted to your role in combat. Many Journal readers relate to that role through the Persian Gulf war of the past year, which added a half million GIs to our nation’s long roster of combat veterans. But veterans of other wars recall combat as a long and exhausting ordeal made up of many small battles — battles that cost the lives of many buddies, that destroyed most of this or that unit and seemed, at that moment, to make little or no contribution to the overall war effort.

World War II battles provide a variety of lessons that can be applied to combat. And the observance of the 50th anniversary of America’s entry in that war coincides with the publication of this winter issue. But World War II was not fought by an all volunteer Army, with soldiers who wore Kevlar helmets and with missiles

that blasted other missiles from the sky.

The point is: Combat is diverse and technology is changing many aspects of battle; even the term battlefield is not appropriate to many combat scenarios.

Combat is often addressed in the context of the heroes it produces. But “heroes” from these pages are the corporals and sergeants who are the NCO Corps. They have been the glue that has held our Army together between wars. They have been charged with taking raw recruits and draftees and whipping them into mental and physical shape. They have been the Reserve components that were often understrength and undertrained on often outdated equipment. They have endured low pay during the eras when America’s working class prospered. They have steeled themselves against American and foreign protesters of policies that professional soldiers do not allow to become their political concern. They have fought a long Cold War with tremendous forbearance and keen awareness of their hair-trigger weapons. They have trained offic-

ers, subordinate NCOs and junior soldiers to work as teams that are the heart of an organized, successful fighting force; they have been the hearts and heads of those smaller elements.

But they cannot dictate the rules of engagement. In the past 10 years alone, American soldiers have been the victims of political killings in Germany, Turkey, the Middle East, the Philippines and Central America. They have been killed during “peacetime” by military forces from North Korea, the former East Germany and Central America. They have died en masse in tragedies such as the Gander, Newfoundland, crash that killed soldiers returning from peacekeeping duty in the Sinai — a crash that some theories blame on terrorists.

Combat is a relative definition, and soldiers face death on undefined battlefields and in undeclared battles that can manifest at any hour of any day.

The NCO has had to adapt to constant change. The horse was replaced by motorized vehicles; weeks of marching were

replaced by train deployments and days or weeks of sailing on troop ships were shortened to hours by airlift. Communications and mobility created a complex and rapidly changing battlefield. More accurate and destructive weapons demanded better offensive and defensive training.

Despite change, NCOs have been the guardians of Army traditions. While "duty, honor and country" are among the proud traditions of our Army, it has bid good-riddance to practices that were not pillars of professionalism. The stereotypical NCO was an overweight drunkard who earned and kept his stripes by being the biggest and the strongest soldier in a unit. He could outfight, outdrink and outwit any man in the outfit. He used brute strength to beat discipline into soldiers. And high desertion rates often reflected soldiers' contempt of their NCOs. They have often been the stumbling blocks toward progress, such as racial integration and merging the Women's Army Corps into the regular Army.

But change was inevitable, and the NCO ultimately made it possible. While rank-and-file soldiers are exposed to officers much more today than in the past, the NCO still sets the tone for soldiers' attitudes. Soldiers are influenced more — positively or negatively — by the examples of their NCO supervisors than by all other Army influences combined. That's a powerful tool that carries equally powerful authority and responsibility.

NCO authority has taken twists and turns in our Army's history. The corporal once wielded God-like authority over his soldiers. In contrast, technicians and specialists in senior NCO grades lacked authority to supervise or command anyone.

While the Army stepped out ahead of the civilian sector to provide equal opportunities for soldiers, it also improved upward mobility for the NCO Corps, which was usually limited to earning battlefield commissions that were often temporary. In combat, units often paid the price of losing experienced NCOs when they were most needed for grassroots leadership. Today's NCOs can more easily attend West Point or OCS. Those who become warrant officers can now be commissioned, whereas the first warrant officers were thought of as "supergrade" enlisted soldiers. And, for those who stay in the enlisted ranks, being an American Army NCO is respected around the world.

The NCO has changed, and so has the

quality of soldiers he leads. Historically, when patriotism was not a motive for enlisting, recruits were often poor slob who could mark time in the Army in lieu of living aimlessly. Or they "volunteered" to join the Army because a judge's alternative was prison. Our NCO Corps has been forced to keep up with the better and brighter recruits.

Soldiers' lifestyles have also changed. Sixty years ago, enlisted soldiers were not allowed to marry. Today's NCO is likely to be married, and he has greater responsibilities to care for his soldiers' families. Great attention was paid to families of soldiers deployed to the Persian Gulf.

In peacetime, when promotions can

seem impossible, and in wartime, when wet-behind-the-ear "kids" pin on chevrons, one constant is coping with the transition from being "one of the guys" to learning how to handle the weight of being an NCO. With varying success, NCOs mentor our newest members.

Those newest members will be the NCO leaders of tomorrow. They will be charged to lead, train, care and maintain, as NCOs have always been. They will experience the ups and downs of Army life. What we do for them and for our units comes down to that bottom line: how our soldiers fare in the next round of combat.

This issue is dedicated to that NCO mission.



NCOs were key leaders in the Cold War victory.

Code of Conduct Guide for Survival . . .

Article I

I am an American, fighting in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

Article II

I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender the members of my command while they still have the means to resist.

By MSG Gil High

As T. R. Felrenbach observed in *This Kind of War* [See book review on page 24.], even when outnumbered or outgunned, a soldier has his weapon, the support of fellow soldiers, a leader to direct the fight and training to help him react to the situation. As a prisoner of war, lacking all these things, a soldier is totally vulnerable — facing what could be the most difficult challenge of his life.

For that reason the Department of Defense created the Code of Conduct.

The code is a product of our Korean War experience. In previous wars, captured soldiers were no longer part of the fight. Their main concerns were survival and escape. In Korea, however, the battle continued in the POW camp. The enemy politically exploited prisoners to further its war effort. Many Americans made damaging, false confessions. Others died because they lost their will to resist and survive.

After the war, President Eisenhower appointed a commission to study the conduct of our POWs and recommend a standard of behavior. The code was written in 1955. In Vietnam, American captives proved the value of the code by resisting interrogation and surviving for years, despite inhumane treatment and conditions.

While the code proved its value, many military leaders, including some returning POWs, suggested that it should be rewritten to clarify seeming contradictions. Some, for example, suggested that a soldier attempting to escape under the guide-

lines of one article might violate another by creating a situation harmful to his comrades or by disobeying a lawful order to not escape. Others pointed out that some wording seemed to be too restrictive.

However, after studying these questions, a Pentagon committee convened to revise the code in 1976 made only subtle changes in the original wording. What is most important is that the committee reaffirmed the importance of the code, calling it "a valued and necessary instrument which establishes high standards of behavior for all members of the Armed Forces."

While many see it as a directive or legally enforceable standard, Air Force LTC Richard E. Porter wrote in the January/February 1982 issue of *Air University Review* that the code is a "guide for survival with honor" (although it also is enforceable under the UCMJ).

Explaining its value, Porter said, "the intent of the code is to provide the essential moral foundation necessary for any successful resistance. Experience shows that an iron link exists between resistance and survival and that the captive who stands by his country's honor and his moral convictions to the utmost of his ability will have the best chance of surviving and the least difficulty in readjusting afterward."

A solid grounding in the principles of honor and courage expressed in the code can provide the moral foundation for survival, but it won't prepare a captive for the anxiety that comes with the reality of cap-

Article III

If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

... with Honor

ture. As violent as battle can be, it is at least a more even contest. The continued war in captivity is more fearful because all the advantages seem to be with the captor.

Despite the circumstances, however, a soldier still has a duty to resist the enemy to the best of his ability. And he also has certain resources, the most important of which is knowledge.

The experiences of Korea and Vietnam show that prisoners who knew their rights and obligations under the Geneva Convention earned better treatment and more of their entitled protections. Demanding your rights, of course, doesn't guarantee they will be granted, but it provides a basis for resistance.

The things you can and should fight for include:

- Food and housing sufficient to ensure your good health.
- Medical care.
- Religious freedom.
- The right to keep your personal property.
- The right to prisoner representation.
- The right to send and receive mail.

Understanding what you are required to do also will help you to draw the line between meeting those obligations and

Article IV

If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.

Article V

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to give name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

inadvertently cooperating with the enemy.

The things you must do include:

- Provide minimal information (such as name, rank, service number, and date of birth), which can be used in the communications and repatriations effort of warring parties.
- Obey camp regulations for your safety and the safety of others.
- Perform whatever labor is appropriate for the welfare and protection of prisoners. NCOs may be compelled to supervise labor details, but cannot be compelled to work. Officers may volunteer, but may not be compelled to work.

Knowing your enemy also increases your survivability as a captive. Just as understanding his tactics will help to win the battle in the field, knowing how he operates will reduce surprises. The worse an enemy's human rights record, the more likely it is that a prisoner will face torture and deprivation, but knowledge of your value to the enemy and to your government will help you survive.

Article VI

I will never forget that I am an American, fighting for freedom, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.

When the shock of capture sets in, it's natural to imagine horrors of torture and death. However, to your captor, you are a valuable resource: You possess information, are a source of labor and may even possess exploitable skills such as language or medical abilities. You're also a negotiating chip in the diplomatic war between enemies. But a dead POW has no value and a dead or maimed prisoner is someone the enemy must answer for after the war.

To break down a prisoner's resistance, the captor will use every available method to isolate prisoners and prolong the shock of capture. His most effective tactic is to break down the POW unit's military organization and internal communications.

While an individual's moral courage is an important fountain of resistance, the Code of Conduct provides an invaluable reminder that he is not alone in his struggle — that he is supported by the understanding, trust and faith of his fellow captives. The code also reminds the soldier that by fulfilling his duty and continuing to resist, he is more likely to survive with honor and self-respect.

How We Won & Win

By (Ret.) GEN Maxwell R. Thurman

Desert Shield/Desert Storm was not a seven-month war, not a 44-day war, and not a 100-hour war. Rather, the genesis of preparation dates back 20 years with a decade (the 1980s) of steadfast "institution building" that resulted in the Desert Storm successes.

In the mid-1970s, four major conceptual changes were at work. One: The Volunteer Army. Two: The Total Force Policy (active, Guard, and Reserve). Three: A doctrinal reformation. Four: A training transformation.

The work of the '70s produced a set of principles that guided the metamorphosis of the 1980s. Warfighting doctrine was published (and) quality personnel were recruited into the Army. We measured soldiers in all components on standards of demonstrated competence. And the Army made a commitment to its people.

The promulgation of AirLand Battle doctrine was essential because our mission is to fight with our sister services and win. A standard doctrine is required in order to form our force structure, to generate requirements for equipment and to procure that equipment ... to train the force to rigorous standards.

"The winner must understand that the next time he plays — or fights — the 'other guy' is going to know what to do."

Of these guiding principles, we found the most important one to be quality. Quality is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Quality soldiers create high-performing units. Quality soldiers have the persistence and perseverance to get the job done in tough environments — like combat. Quality soldiers have fewer disciplinary problems. And, finally, quality people have the versatility to win in any spectrum of conflict, from the jungles of Panama to the sands of Iraq.

I would like to set up two kinds of lessons learned (from the Gulf war) — one set at the national, or strategic, level and the second at the operational, or tactical, level.

The first and most important lesson learned is a thematic lesson — the same one that (the University of Nevada at Las Vegas basketball team) learned April 1st. That lesson says that the "winner should begin preparing right away." The winner must understand that the next time he plays — or fights — the "other guy" is going to know what to do. Talent (or technology) alone won't do it all. The winner still has to muster greater will. He has to do better planning and practice and modernization investment. He will still have to win the "next" game, which will be decidedly different from the last one! ...

Our performance enjoyed "wide scrutiny." It was impossible in a CNN world to deny the scrutiny, and, while we can declare our doctrine successful on the one hand, we must also be aware that the Soviets — plus all enemies present and potential — have watched the United States operate and have begun assessing our

strengths and weaknesses ...

Back to strategic lessons learned: Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger (said in 1984) ... "the single most critical element of a successful democracy is a strong consensus of support and agreement for its basic purposes." He went on to say that successful operations were characterized as follows:

- Vital to the national interest or allies' interest.
- Wholehearted commitment — in it to win.
- Clear political and military objectives.
- Correct relationship between objectives and force size and composition — constantly adjusted as required. This means: Listen to the CINC.
- Support of the American people and Congress.
- Combat should be the last resort.

President Bush gave us those clear objectives, reported them to the American people and made decisions to conclude military actions upon achievement of those objectives (where both Panama and Iraq are concerned) ...

(Operational and tactical lessons learned ...)

- Quality people, with quality equipment, with quality training, under quality leadership, can accomplish almost anything ...
- Our AirLand Battle doctrine worked ...
- We moved forces farther and faster than ever before ...
- We employed overwhelming combat power ...
- We confirmed that rapid deployability is essential ...
- We relied on light forces early; in the future, they must be highly lethal — the next adversary won't wait 30 days to six months to attack.
- ... precision weapons will cause fewer casualties ...
- ... The Reserve call-up worked well but improvements will have to be made in the training readiness of the combat elements of the National Guard.
- Finally, we took care of our families in an unprecedented way ...

The most profound lesson learned is, if your weapons, doctrine or tactics went to war, you can assume they have been compromised. The enemy, his sponsors, or anyone they decide to sell it to is presently taking our technology and doctrine and tactics apart to see what makes them tick! ...

Whatever we do (to prepare our future military), we must remember that our people always come first. We ... are committed to the person, not just his or her talent or capability.

- Dignity is essential ...
- Unit readiness and family support are related ...
- Our (military) services are the undisputed world-class equal opportunity employers ...
- Every soldier and airman is a caring person. Our obligation is to provide them caring leadership ...

These are excerpts from a speech to the Army and Air Force Mutual Aid Association on April 9, 1991.

Low Intensity Conflict Army Adapts to Global Threats

By LTC Sam Henderson
and MAJ Rose McKinney

The most likely roles of the NCO in the next few years involve some aspect of Low Intensity Conflict.

Much of what the Army will be doing in the next decade and beyond is tied to Low Intensity Conflict. It is a level of political-military confrontation that falls below conventional war and above routine, peaceful competition. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. It ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means that employ political, economic, informational and military instruments. And, while usually localized, generally in the Third World, these conflicts can have regional and global implications.

Today's Army is focusing its attention on systems and organizations to support operations that are short of war. Such operations reflect current national military objectives: Deter or defeat aggression in concert with allies, ensure global access and influence, promote regional stability and cooperation, stop the flow of illegal drugs and combat terrorism.

The world is still a dangerous place, despite drastic changes to the Soviet threat, which has been the focus of our training and readiness. President Bush has stated: "The threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe launched with little or no warning is today more remote than at any other point in the postwar period. And with the emergence of democracy in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact has lost its military meaning."


To be sure, the former USSR is still a nuclear superpower with an enormous military capability. However,

the threat of a U.S.-Soviet military conflict is lower today than at any time since World War II.

This does not mean that we can lower our military guard. The president recently emphasized that America must possess forces that are able to respond to threats in any part of the world. Even in a world where democracy and freedom have made gains, threats remain: terrorism, hostage-taking, renegade regimes, unpredictable rulers and new sources of instability. Other threats are illegal drugs and natural disasters. There are also unconventional threats by insurgencies, especially in Latin America, the Middle East and certain areas on the fringes of the former Soviet Union.

The threat of terrorism — and the use of terrorist tactics by insurgents fighting U.S.-supported governments — has been with us for some time and it will continue. Terrorism adversely affects our regional interests and, more immediately, it regularly claims American lives.

In 1990, the United States remained, by far, the most popular target of international terrorists. Ten Americans were killed and 34 were injured in 197 anti-U.S. incidents. Most of the attacks occurred in Latin America, where we were targeted by both terrorists and insurgent groups. Terrorists also attacked Americans in (by descending order) Asia, Europe, Africa and the Middle East. In recent years, the most deadly and spectacular terrorist attacks have been sponsored by governments that have used terrorism as a tool to further their foreign and domestic policies. This state-sponsored terrorism was responsible for the 1983 bombing that



SSG Phil Prater

A rioting civilian is detained in Panama.

killed over 240 servicemen in Beirut, Lebanon.

Another major threat to our national security is the international drug trade. As stated in our 1991 national security strategy, no threat does more damage to our national values and institutions, and the domestic violence generated by the drug trade is all too familiar. Trafficking organizations undermine the sovereign governments of our friends and weaken and distort national economies with a vast, debilitating black market and large funding requirements for enforcement, criminal justice, prevention and treatment.

A major role of the Army will be to assist our drug enforcement agencies to attack the drug trade at its source and to interdict drugs as traffickers attempt to smuggle them across our borders.

A less traditional threat to our national security, but one that is sure to cause American soldiers to be deployed around the world, is that of natural disasters. Our national security strategy states that we will respond quickly and substantially to the suffering caused by disasters. In recent years, the Army has provided humanitarian assistance to survivors of earthquakes in Nicaragua, the USSR, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Ecuador. We have also provided disaster relief after a volcanic eruption in Colombia; to victims of Hurricane Hugo and the Bangladesh typhoon; and to Afghani and Kurdish refugees. We have also supported U.S. civil authorities during forest fires and after the Exxon Valdez oil spill.

Obviously, despite the end of the Cold War, the Army's mission in the Low Intensity Conflict environment will only increase to meet the wide range of threats America continues to face.

New Army strategy reflects the changing world. The three pillars of that strategy are: forward presence, power projection and force reconstitution. This means that every Army unit must be ready to deploy on short notice to preserve peace and stability.

Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict fall into four broad categories outlined in FM 100-20: support for insurgency and counter-insurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations and peacetime contingency operations.

Political objectives drive military decisions at every level during Low Intensity Conflict operations. These conflicts rarely have a clear beginning or end, and



Peacetime contingencies include non-combatant evacuations.

they rarely include decisive actions and ultimate victory. They are, by nature, protracted struggles. Developing an attitude of disciplined, focused perseverance will help leaders reject short-term success in favor of actions that are designed to accomplish long-term goals.

Peacetime contingency operations are different than those in war — which are often conducted for purely military reasons — because they might complement purely political initiatives. They are characterized by short-term, rapid projection or employment of forces. This option is often used to avoid or manage a crisis. Such operations include, but are not limited to: shows of force and demonstrations, non-combatant evacuations, rescue and recovery, strikes and raids, peace-making, unconventional warfare, disaster relief, security assistance surges and support to U.S. civil authorities.

The Army's training focuses on a unit's

Mission Essential Task List. New METLs are being discovered and mastered to address humanitarian assistance and post-conflict activities that are placing soldiers in distant lands with new missions. Joint and combined exercises also serve as training and rehearsal opportunities for operating with other services and other nations' forces.

In quieter, less publicized operations, small Army elements are providing security assistance in many countries around the globe, often in isolated places. These elements provide advice and assistance to allied soldiers and units in nearly every specialty.

SMA Richard A. Kidd has told NCOs that they must be physically fit, well educated, trained, disciplined and in tough positions. To these pillars of excellence, there are other implications for the NCO. In the 1990s and beyond, you must be able to teach your skills to others who speak




SSG Phil Prater



SSG Phil Prater

Short-term, rapid projection or employment of forces characterize some peacetime operations.



SSG William H. McMichael

No Special Operations Forces monopoly.

little or no English. This will no longer be the exclusive domain of Special Operations Forces. Foreign language skills will enhance your ability to perform in a Low Intensity Conflict environment. It means that you will likely operate in an isolated area, working with and training military and civilian counterparts.

We will have a smaller Army and NCO Corps, but American forces must be capable of dealing effectively with the full range of threats. Whether advising allied soldiers or fighting side by side in combined operations, NCOs in the next decade must be prepared to adapt to politically dominated, culture-specific situations. That is what Low Intensity Conflict is all about.

Henderson is chief of the Army Proponency Office for Low Intensity Conflict, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. McKinney is an intelligence officer in that office.

Preparing for Combat

By MAJ Fred V. Flynn

Volumes have been written about preparing units for combat, and rightly so as this is the No. 1 priority in peacetime. The focus of this article, however, is on leaders preparing themselves for combat.

This process involves examining mental, physical and spiritual aspects of daily life. By exploring these areas, leaders will better know themselves and be more capable of leading others into combat. This important concept is the first principle of leadership discussed in FM 22-103.

The day of deployment, however, is not the time to start this critical process. How often does a leader rush into his house at the last minute, throw some TA-50 together, yell for more socks and T-shirts, have a fuss with his wife, and then run out the door, only to leave the family and himself feeling emotionally unsettled? If a senior leader is to effectively prepare for combat, he should take the time now to examine the mental, physical and spiritual aspects of his life.

There are three considerations in mental preparation: technical and tactical proficiency, combat leadership style and addressing fear in combat.

First, it is imperative that a leader be technically and tactically proficient. If he is not, his soldiers will see this and will not risk their lives for him. "Good ole boys" are great on the softball field, but those who do not know how to fight and survive will not be respected or followed.

Siegfried Sassoon, quoted in *Parameters*, makes this point in his book *The Memoirs of George Sherston*, about a WWI British officer. Of one officer, Sassoon writes: "Personal charm was not his strong point, and he made no pretension to it. He was aggressive and blatant, but he knew his job, and for that we respected him."

The second consideration in mental preparation is knowing how to lead men in combat. Just as our nation and our Army must undergo a transition from peace to war, so must the mindset and the leadership style of the soldier. This does not suggest that leaders should have separate peacetime and wartime leadership styles. However, leaders need to make a mental transition before deploying to a combat zone.

Retired ADM Joseph Metcalf observed this need during his command of Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada. When a severely damaged and fuel-starved Army helicopter landed on a Navy vessel and requested refueling, the Navy crew was reluctant to service the chopper. After debate and wasted time, the sailors insisted that the Army pilot sign for the fuel.

Metcalf intervened and made it clear that circumstances did not require following normal peacetime procedures. He stressed that common sense mandated quick, safe and efficient means to accomplish the mission and to save lives.

Retired Marine MG John A. Lejeune also addressed the transition from peace to wartime. In a *Marine Corps Gazette* article, he wrote about leadership in combat: "Your men must see that you share their every hardship. The study of leadership involves, therefore, first of all a study of human nature. One must put himself in the place of those whom he would lead; he must have a full understanding of their thoughts, their attitudes, their emotions, their aspirations and their fears."


Was Lejeune suggesting that U.S. Marines are capable of fear? In his wisdom and honesty, he fully understood the human dimension of fear, which is the final consideration in mental preparation.

Fear and its influence on soldiers is a concern to every leader. It was even a concern for Audie Murphy, the most highly decorated soldier of WWII. Despite his bravery in some 400 days of combat, Murphy learned that a companion to bravery is often fear.

In the book *To Hell and Back*, Murphy relates his anxieties about death, dismemberment and measuring up to the expectations of the men around him. Two decades later, Murphy was still plagued by his fears in the form of nightmares, according to an article in the *Kansas City Star*. The point here is that fear is normal, and it should be expected in combat. Soldiers should not feel cowardly just because they experience fear.


The burden of fear is heavier for leaders than for other soldiers. Leaders have to deal with personal fears as well as take responsibility for possibly sending their soldiers to their deaths.

U.S. News & World Report quoted GEN Normal Schwarzkopf as paraphrasing GEN Robert E. Lee: "The military is



The samurai exemplify and spiritual qualities

Readying the mind, body and soul for going into and leading in battle



the only calling I know that demands that you kill those you love the most: To be a good commander you must love your soldiers; to be a good commander you must send them out to die.”

LTC Peter S. Kindsvatter, also writing in *Parameters*, relates the story of a brave German soldier who was unable to assume a leadership role. He did not realize how great his burden was until he failed as a leader during combat.

Kindsvatter cites several mechanisms for coping with fear, such as a closer relationship with God, a closer relationship with the men in a unit (comradeship), an attitude of “it can’t happen to me,” or an attitude of “live one day at a time” (to enjoy wine, women and song). Some soldiers turn to God and their comrades for comfort and support. Others choose to escape via denial and a “party” mentality. These are coping mechanisms:

ways for soldiers to deal with the horrors and fears of combat. They provide a sense of order to a soldier’s chaotic and deadly environment.

Physical preparation for combat is no less important. This includes physical conditioning as well as allowing for regular and sufficient sleep.

Physical conditioning is second only to technical and tactical proficiency, according to Dr. Roger J. Spiller of the Army’s Command and General Staff College. Leaders in poor or average shape are unable to cope with combat stress, Spiller said, and are more easily demoralized.

I learned this lesson when I volunteered for a mission — immediately after spending about two months in the field — that involved a platoon patrol on the East-West German border, over rough terrain and in deep snow. I volunteered to carry the M-60,

but I had to give it up about half way through the patrol. At the end of the patrol, I was totally exhausted. My ability to think, reason

and to make quick and accurate decisions was gone. Back at camp, I went to my room and I became violently ill. I was physically and mentally exhausted because I allowed myself to get out of shape.

That taught me an invaluable lesson. Prolonged field duty, eating on the run, insufficient sleep and a lack of physical training caught up with me. All leaders need to realize that physical conditioning is vital to preparing for combat, for it hardens bodies, minds and spirits, and it reduces the effects of stress.

Sleep is also an essential part of physical preparation. In the words of Napoleon, “Fatigue makes cowards of all men.” Sleep plans should be developed and practiced in peacetime, and strictly followed in combat. However, as a 1988 Academy of Health Sciences study found, senior leaders generally do not adhere to sleep plans.

The study, at the National Training Center, found that after 72 hours of field operations, senior leaders started to make bad decisions. They averaged only three hours of sleep daily in a very stressful environment. NCOs did slightly better, averaging four to six hours of sleep daily. Privates, however, averaged eight hours.

The spiritual aspect of combat preparation includes a leader’s relationships with his family and friends, as well as his more personal relationship with God.

Retired COL Roger H.C. Donlon, the first Medal of Honor winner in Vietnam, elaborated on the importance of family and friends to a soldier in combat: “When your mettle is tested, you’ll draw strength from sources deep within that you never knew existed. Family and friends ... are two of these sources of strength. Take the time before deploying to make sure your relationship with these people is what it should be.”

Religion provides a sense of peace and comfort to many soldiers in the chaotic and stressful environment of war. COL Dave Peterson, head chaplain for Central Command, wrote that thousands of soldiers in Southwest Asia renewed their belief and trust in their God as they faced the possibility of dying.

By preparing himself mentally, physically and spiritually, a leader will better know himself. This will enable him to more capably and confidently lead the soldiers entrusted to him. Too often, a leader devotes all of his efforts to getting his unit ready for deployment, totally ignoring getting himself ready.

He owes it to himself — and to the soldiers he leads — to be at his absolute best when a combat situation is at its absolute worst.

Flynn is the S-3 for the 5th Battalion, 29th Field Artillery, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colo.

F. HUGHES

es the mental, physical that prepare warriors.

Coping with Stress

By Jim Collins

Reactions to combat stress vary in as many ways as there are individuals and units. Inexperienced units tend to suffer more battle fatigue casualties than experienced units. And where one is on the battlefield also affects the type of stress reaction. According to studies from the Korean and Vietnam wars, combat units showed severe symptoms while some combat service units displayed antisocial, immature behavior and occasional drug

abuse. Support soldiers exposed to minimal danger or hardship suffered more from frustration, boredom and separation from family than from combat.

You cannot hide from stress. Nor can you escape it. As a leader, however, it becomes imperative long before you enter combat that you recognize the causes, identify the symptoms and employ techniques to regulate, or otherwise mitigate stress before it produces battle fatigue casualties.

Recognizing causes

Everyone faces day-to-day pressures which must be overcome to get the job done. Such pressures are not as traumatic as divorce, competing for a job, or burning the Sunday roast to a crisp. Stress occurs when an event or a situation requires action, creates internal emotional conflict or poses a threat. Some typical battlefield sources of stress include fear of death or physical harm, fatigue, exposure to the sounds of battle, weather (too hot, too cold, too wet), isolation, lack of sleep,



hunger, dehydration, too much or too little information and ambiguous instructions or orders. Coping with these events or situations can cause stress, which can lead to battle fatigue.

Stress also has its positive effects. It can produce alertness and arousal for peak performance. Stress can help soldiers to overcome unpleasant situations — to run that extra mile or to act heroically in combat.

Identifying symptoms

Any NCO who has experienced the pressures of combat will be familiar with some or all of the following symptoms of stress:

- You perspire, tremble or become nauseated.

- You develop "cotton mouth."
- Your muscles refuse to do what you (or anyone else) tell them to do.
- You are tired beyond tired.
- You forget orders or cannot remember the beginning of a sentence by the time it ends.
- You fear non-existent threats and feel angry, helpless, guilty, irritable, moody or nervous.
- You see light at the end of the tunnel, but it appears to be coming your way, and not lighting your way.

Standing in harm's way, you and your soldiers may react in any, all or none of these ways, depending on the intensity or longevity of the situation and the effectiveness of any stress-management training you might have received.

If the pressures become too much, the response is as if your body and mind switch to automatic pilot. And, no matter how hard you try, you cannot find the switch that allows you to regain conscious control. As famed military historian S.L.A. Marshall once said, "There is no such person as the soldier who is dauntless under all conditions of combat." Stated in less elegant words, every soldier has his breaking point. Battle fatigue symptoms can range from normal and uncomfortable emotions and physical complaints that do not affect performance, to those which interfere only slightly, and those which render soldiers incapable of functioning.

Managing problems

The problem of combat fatigue is not an indication of moral weakness, cowardice or personality disorder. The term "battle fatigue" (or "combat fatigue") encompasses individual and unit reaction to the trauma of combat, which can result in varying degrees of incapacitation or inability to perform. Ignoring or neglecting the signs only worsens the condition. The wise leader quickly acts to:

- Serve as a role model to prevent stress reaction.
- Initiate and support stress management programs.
- Provide information to reduce stress
- Ensure that each soldier has mastered at least one stress-coping technique.
- Look out for soldiers' welfare.
- Communicate with soldiers personally to detect signs of stress.
- Create a spirit to win under stress.

Stress-coping skills require practice in

programs tailored to fit the needs and mission of specific units.

Coping with stress should, ideally, be practiced under conditions as similar to combat as possible. It should also be noted that the automatic pilot switch can work in your favor if training has been realistic. FM 26-2, Management of Stress in Army Operations, provides a more detailed treatment of the topic.

FM 26-2 states: "The primary stress management technique is to assure soldiers that their leaders are doing their best for them. Since the basic necessities of life assume even greater importance on the battlefield, leaders must do the following: Ensure that soldiers receive the best training. Look out for their soldiers' welfare before their own. Ensure that soldiers get as much rest as possible. Ensure that the best cover and shelter are available. Keep soldiers well supplied with food, water, and other essentials. Get mail, news, and information to the soldiers. Provide soldiers with the best medical, logistical, and other support. Maintain high morale."

Confidence plays a major role in defending against stress. And that confidence is based on the technical and tactical competence of both leaders and soldiers; unit cohesion and effectiveness; reliable, adequate equipment; and realistic, relevant and systematic training.

Physical fitness training also increases tolerance to stress during continuing operations. And training on basic stress-coping skills — such as deep breathing exercises, muscle-tension-relaxation exercises and self-suggestion exercises involving imagery and meditation — are further aids. Deep breathing techniques are the easiest to learn, while the others require longer instruction and practice time.

Treatment for battle fatigue depends on the severity of the symptoms and where a soldier can be helped. Sometimes, it can be a matter of getting a good night's rest, or a hot meal, or a day or two of rest and relaxation before returning for duty.

More severe cases might require medical and psychiatric care at the battalion aid station. Even these soldiers could be treated and released in hours, be held for rest and relaxation, or be evacuated even further.

The initial responsibility to recognize, identify and manage stress to maintain and preserve the effectiveness of a unit remains with you, the NCO.





Women soldiers in Desert Shield.

Lifting the Ban on Women in Combat

By Evelyn D. Harris

The United States is as close as it has ever gotten to lifting combat exclusions for women.

The war in the Persian Gulf, and the good reviews of women's performance there, focused more attention on laws and policies that exclude women from combat. Shortly after the war, in May, the House of Representatives voted to lift the law excluding women from most combat aircraft. Then, on July 31, the Senate eliminated regulations that prohibited women from flying combat missions.

In November, in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years 1992 and 1993, Congress confirmed these ear-

lier actions by lifting the ban on women flying combat aircraft and allowing female pilots and crews of carrier-based aircraft to be assigned to carriers. It left in place a law banning women from serving on combat vessels.

But before lifting what is left of the combat exclusions, Congress asked the president to appoint a commission to study the financial and social consequences of repeal, including issues such as loss time due to pregnancy. The commission's report is due in November.

No law prohibits female soldiers from serving in combat. When Congress passed combat exclusion laws in 1948, they applied only to the Navy and Air Force, and prevented women from serv-

ing on ships and aircraft in combat missions. Congress did not include the Army in the laws because it was too difficult to define "combat" as the term applies to the Army's mission, according to retired Air Force MG Jeanne Holm, who wrote a history of women in the military. However, Holm said, Congress expected the Army to mind the spirit of the laws.

If Congress lifts the remainder of the combat exclusions, the law would still leave the ultimate decisions on women's roles in the military with DOD officials. But lifting the last of the exclusions applying to the Navy and Marine Corps could lead to pressure on the Army to allow women in the infantry. Opponents of lifting the exclusions fear that allowing

women in the infantry might also force some into it.

They have said that it would not be realistic to make combat positions voluntary for women while they are not voluntary for men.

In an interview with American Forces Information Service in July, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force, Management and Personnel Christopher Jehn said that if Congress lifts the combat exclusions for women, it would knock out much of the rationale for excluding women from a draft.

However, Jehn and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney have both stated that lifting the exclusions would give defense officials more flexibility.

In a press conference shortly before the Senate voted to allow women to fly on combat missions, Becky Constantino, chair of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, said, "A change in the law would give defense officials the flexibility to best use every resource... and move the military forward to permit employment based on ability, not gender."

At its 1991 Fall Conference, DACOWITS recommended the secretary of defense support the repeal of exclusions. It cited the following rationale:

- Ability rather than gender becomes the basis for assignment;
- The services gain flexibility to fully use qualified personnel;
- Opportunities are expanded for women to compete fairly for assignments and promotions;
- Acceptance of servicewomen as full partners is enhanced.

Further, the events in the Persian Gulf demonstrated that the entire theater of operations became part of the modern battlefield.

How do female NCOs feel about the combat exclusions? Based on press reports and interviews for this article, the majority do not seem to share women officers' beliefs that their own careers have been hampered by the exclusions. They do not support the official DOD position that lifting exclusions would give military officials more flexibility. However, they hope that feminist groups and other political pressures will not force officials to act against what's best for the military and the national defense.

CSM Emily F. Myles, commandant of

the NCO academy at Fort Harrison, Ind., said, "I firmly believe that the senior level Army staff should be able to designate what positions could be occupied by female soldiers. I trust them to make informed and intelligent decisions. They, as well as I, realize that we are all soldiers, and as such can never be out of harm's way. Wherever we are, we must be prepared to carry out the mission."

SGM Toni Lofton, who is stationed in Europe, said, "Women should be able to do anything they are capable of doing. They proved that in Desert Storm. If a woman is capable of meeting the standards, she should be treated the same as everyone. I don't believe in separate standards for women, though. Standards should be the same."

Sharing Lofton's disapproval of dual standards is MSG Linda Lee, who is stationed in Washington, D.C. "When Canada lifted combat exclusions, women had to meet the same standards as men.

Out of 102 women, only one met the strength standard. That's how the United States should do it. We shouldn't yield to pressure when women complain that the standards are too high for women to meet. That would be a disservice to women, men and the national defense," Lee said.

Lee cited an article in the National Review by former DACOWITS member Elaine Donnelly in which she came out against dual standards for jobs involving close combat. Donnelly defines close combat as "finding, closing with, and killing or capturing the enemy; it is more than the experience of being in danger. In that brutal environment, women don't have an equal opportunity to survive, or to help their fellow soldiers survive."

Added Donnelly: "It's not realistic to expect that for men war will be hell, but for women it will just be heck."

Harris has covered defense issues in Washington, D.C., for AFIS for the past 10 years.

Opinion: Expand Women's Role

By SFC Donna Patzer

Women are an integral part of today's military. If we acknowledge that their roles will increase, we must address the issue of women in combat. Few debates can become more heated and emotional. Many who accept women in the military view the issue from a peacetime perspective and ignore the fact that women must also fulfill their duties during war.

According to Newsweek (Aug., 1991) more than 35,000 women were in the recent Persian Gulf war, flying support aircraft, serving on missile crews and aboard Navy tenders. Eleven died and two were taken prisoner.

National law and military policies restrict women from jobs that could place them in combat. This inhibits career progression by excluding women from many jobs they are capable of doing.

These restrictions have a negative affect on men. Male sailors serve long and frequent tours at sea while female sailors routinely fill only shore billets.

Society and warfare have changed. Outdated restrictions creating artificial barriers need to be repealed. The argument that women don't have the physical strength and endurance of men is

sound. But, women often are barred from jobs strictly because of gender.

Pregnancy is another issue. Women are pregnant for only a short time, and many never are pregnant while on active duty. A 1981 Defense study, *Women in the Military*, concluded that women lose less time from their jobs than men, including time lost for pregnancy. Significantly, men lost more time primarily due to drug abuse, alcohol abuse or disciplinary problems.

Another argument is that women cannot handle combat stress. There is little evidence to support the notion.

No evidence exists to suggest women will not perform as effectively in combat as men. That debate is really based on social norms, values and attitudes.

The time to integrate women into combat roles is now. Excluding women does not improve force effectiveness. It does deny the military skilled and qualified personnel. The question is not whether women should be in combat; it is whether women should be in the military.

It is time to base military service on qualifications — not gender.

Patzer is the EO adviser for Tripler Army Medical Center, Hawaii.

Sgt. Bill Mauldin

'The Enlisted Man's Cartoonist'



© Bill Mauldin

By J. Collins

In war, "humor is sanity." Makes sense to me.

There is experience and authority behind that statement, for it comes from the man considered the foremost military cartoonist of all time — Bill Mauldin. He created the cartoon characters Willie

and Joe, who appeared in the Mediterranean edition of *Stars and Stripes* during World War II, in other publications and in numerous books that followed.

Now living in semi-retirement in Santa Fe, N.M., Mauldin shares with the *Journal* and its readers some cartoons, some stories behind the cartoons and comment on combat.

"Without humor, war would drive any sane person out of his mind. War is insane, an outrage, barbaric and devoid of sense," Mauldin believes.

The two-time Pulitzer Prize winner, although not a high school graduate, has six honorary degrees and doctorates. Born on a farm in Mountain Park, N.M., his life-long love affair with the Army began "when I was a youngster. It was a great event for me to watch a whole cavalry division on mountain maneuvers near my home. Those soldiers were 20 feet tall to me."

In 1941, while in the Army in Louisiana, Mauldin was "captured" by a couple of Yellow Legs, members of one of the 45th Division's last regiments on horseback.

"As resourceful cavalymen, they had some canned beer in their saddle bags. They shared a brew with me while I told them about my exposure to the Army as a kid in New Mexico.

"This grizzled master sergeant drove up in a shrunken version of what was to become the Jeep. [Actually, Mauldin said, it was the first Jeep-like vehicle he had ever seen, made by a small company called American Bantam.] As we shot the bull, I told him I came from a long line of grease monkeys and asked if he would mind if I took a look underneath. I was interested in the way the front axle was made and asked him if the axle broke what he'd

do to his vehicle . . . shoot it?"

And thus was born one of Mauldin's most-used, most "redrawn" and most remembered cartoons, showing a first sergeant preparing to shoot his trusty steed, which had suffered the mechanical equivalent of a broken leg.

"I didn't realize at the time that I'd created a perfect cartoon. No words were needed to convey the message."

Not all of SGT Mauldin's cartoon messages were welcomed in all quarters. He is not called "the enlisted man's cartoonist" without reason, for the strictly enlisted perspective of Willie and Joe did not always agree with those at headquarters.

GEN George Patton once called him on the carpet over his "grimy" portrayal of soldiers. But, then, GEN Eisenhower admired the sergeant's work.

Mauldin's perspective is understandable. He comes from a long line of soldiers "who fought as enlisted men in all the American wars. I still kid my son, Bruce, who retired as a lieutenant colonel, for breaking the family's enlisted tradition.

"During a second tour in Vietnam, Bruce [a captain at the time] was an airborne chauffeur flying a Huey. BG Patton [son of WWII Patton] got on board and told him to fly him back to his CP. When Patton saw Bruce's nameplate, he asked if he was related to me. Bruce told him I was his father and they both had a big laugh."

Every Veteran's Day, cartoonist Charles Schulz does a "Peanuts" tribute to Mauldin's Willie and Joe. "I'd never met Charlie and I had no idea why he had been doing this. When I finally did meet him I thanked him because after each Veteran's Day I'd get a lot of orders for my books. I told him I thought it was great, that he kept oldtimers like me in circulation, but what had I ever done for him.

"He said, 'I was a machine gunner in France in World War II,' and that made sense to me."

As we departed, the former sergeant extended an invitation: "Any time a sergeant wants to drop by and drink a beer, he's welcome."

And that made sense to me.






"Unnerstand, I want just as much respect around here as if I was still first sergeant!"

© Bill Mauldin



"I need a couple of guys what don't owe me no money for a little routine patrol."

© Bill Mauldin



"That's all I have to say this morning, men. All right, dismissed . . . I said dismissed!"

© Bill Mauldin

Civil War Added NCO Roles

By Dr. Robert H. Bouilly

The age of linear warfare in North America expanded through the colonial period, the American Revolution and into the Civil War. Linear warfare — the fighting of battles by lines of soldiers — has long since given way to a more dispersed battlefield in the face of weapons with ever increasing lethality and range.

As the battlefield changed, NCOs gained responsibility and authority. However, we need to understand the role of the NCO in earlier periods to appreciate his modern role. What little we know about the NCO role comes from two main sources: training manuals and scattered accounts by soldiers. The predominant sources are writings by NCO volunteers in the Civil War.

In linear warfare, forces tried to defeat each other by facing off in rows. As both lines approached one another, soldiers attempted to kill or wound as many opponents as possible, hoping the opponents would be forced to withdraw. In theory, this tactic exerted maximum shock caused by a volley of fire or bayonet charges.

By the 1850s, a typical Army company included four sergeants and four corporals. Attrition, however, caused most units to fight with fewer NCOs as the Civil War progressed.

In battle, a regiment would line each company in two ranks. The captain stood to the right of the company with the first rank and the first sergeant stood with the second rank. The first sergeant was also known as the "covering sergeant" or "orderly sergeant" of the captain. The second sergeant, also called the "left guiding sergeant," marched behind the second rank. The remaining NCOs and lieutenants took regularly spaced positions behind the line and served as "file closers;" their jobs were to keep the line together and to help soldiers as problems arose.

The NCO had four primary combat duties: as guides who marched units to and on the battlefield, as replacements for killed or wounded officers, as line closers and as carriers and protectors of the regimental colors. A less defined but equally important role was NCO leadership by example.

As the young CPL Leander Stillwell described his orderly sergeant after the first day of the Battle of Shiloh: "He was a man of nerve and courage, and by word and deed had done more that day to hold us green and untried boys in ranks and firmly to our duty than any other man in the company."

As company guides, the first and second sergeants helped communicate the officers' orders. In this role, they were more assistants than leaders.

The dress parades and drills practiced in camp reflected actual movement in combat. The regiment aligned with the flags in the front rank as sergeants on the ends of the line maintained positions of right angles to the flag, regardless of the direction the flag was moving. Without this alignment, an infantry unit would disintegrate into a rabble devoid of any capacity to provide shock in the battle line.

Constant adjustments had to be made. SGT Rice C. Bull commented on adjustments during the Battle of Chancellorsville in 1863. "Looking back at our abandoned line (I could see) a scattered line of (Confederates) coming toward us on the double-quick . . . Coming to a halt they dressed their line, which was much broken and lay down . . . After crossing . . . they halted and again dressed their lines that were broken by the thick bushes. . . ."

In the absence of officers, the ranking NCO assumed those duties. CPL Philo Handy was one such NCO after the first day of the Battle of Shiloh. Fifty men were in

his unit when the April 1862 battle began and Handy was left in charge of the remaining 13 who could fight. Handy wrote:

"Co. D started on the march with only one commissioned officer, 2LT Wallace . . . (who) was overcome by heat and had to fall out . . . and I, as first sergeant, was in command of the company . . . But I must have been a strange looking 'commanding officer.' I was barefooted, breeches rolled up nearly to the knees, feet and ankles 'scratched and tanned,' and my face covered with sweat and dirt . . . But I stalked down the line, bare feet and all, with my musket at a shoulder arms, and looking fully . . . proud . . ."

As file closers, NCOs and junior officers tried to keep battle formations and facilitate weapons fire. Baron von Steuben, in his *Blue Book*, advised that NCOs should "encourage men to silence and to fire rapidly and true."

The manuals of that time often admonished the file closers to kill deserters from the line, if necessary to preserve order. MG Bedford Forrest is known to have killed a



fleeing color bearer at the Battle of Murfreesboro in 1864. But, I have not found an account of an NCO who killed a soldier under such circumstances. The file closers also carried special tools, such as bullet extractors to help unclog rifles.

As we look at earlier warfare, it is hard to attach as much significance to carrying flags into battle as did the soldiers of that time. It seems now to have been a waste of men. Regiments went into battle with regimental and national flags; some companies also had state flags, but these were not usually displayed in combat. SGT Hamlin Coe wrote in his diary after the 1864 Battle of Adairsville: "I was with the guard of colors. There were ten of us when we charged, and only three came off the field. I brought the old flag off the field, torn and riddled with balls. The boys cheered the rags when I brought them off, and we had a grand greeting."

NCOs also had occasional leadership duties on the battlefield. One was supervising picket duty and the other was on the skirmishing line. Modern warfare resembles the skirmishing line of the Civil War more than any other tactic of linear warfare. It was in this area that the NCO's role greatly expanded in subsequent wars.

Routly is the USASMA historian.



Why Study Military History?

By CSM Wade P. Hampton

In the winter of 1778, Washington led his Army into its winter encampment, what we now call Valley Forge. His Army had been in the field for three years, training for three years and led by officers for three years. This Army was not all that it could be: It was not fit to fight, it had never won a campaign and it was not proud. It was, in fact, a poorly led, poorly disciplined and defeated Army.

That winter, Washington did several things to improve his Army, but the most important thing was to allow Baron von Steuben to form an NCO Corps. During the harsh winter, that corps established discipline and training and provided sound leadership to soldiers. This corps of special men — the first American NCOs — allowed Washington to march out of Valley Forge with some of the finest light infantry units in the world.

For most NCOs, there is a tendency to equate the study of history as something that was, and still is, an exclusive concern of officers. But I want to tell you how and why NCOs should study history.

Whether spoken or present in practice, professionalism is part of today's NCO Corps. A professional is an expert in a particular field who constantly strives for improvement. This drive is useless without knowledge of the past. Learning from your mistakes can be a painful process. Learning from the mistakes of others is painless and easy.

History gives us a way of looking at how other people in other days accomplished their missions.

The study of military history is a key to self improvement for the professional NCO. NCOs must know the roots of their profession. How and why did the NCO evolve into his current role? "Training the trainers" is a current phrase we use. However, isn't it intriguing that this was being practiced as early as 1778? When reading about von Steuben's model company, you are struck by the similarities of his approach and today's Army.

He taught an elite group of men a unique method of warfighting. These

men passed those lessons along to others. The victory at Yorktown, a victory that won our independence, can be said to have been earned on the drill fields at Valley Forge.

NCOs cannot truly understand their profession, or the soldiers they lead, until they study their past. In that study, the NCO needs to look at leaders who were both good and bad. One can learn about what made leaders successful or unsuccessful. History reveals a lot about the decisions they made.

The most important part of the study of history is applying lessons learned. This helps us avoid past mistakes and precludes us from trying things that have not been proven by our experiences. For example: Maintenance of personal equipment and weapons has always been an NCO's job. But what can happen when this task is forgotten or ignored? Read about Task Force Smith in 1950 and you'll find the answer to that question.

You can learn a lot about famous soldiers. You might be surprised at what you can learn. Few people, for example, know that Audie Murphy was initially rejected by the Marine Corps and as a paratrooper. But the National Guardsman went on to become an NCO, earn a battlefield commission and become the most decorated American of World War II.

By looking at the common traits of good leaders, you might find something to improve or inspire your leadership.

Tradition surrounds us in the military. Yet, in most cases, we are not aware of what it really is. How many soldiers know the how and why of the many bugle calls that are played on the installation? Where did "taps" and "tattoo" come from and why are they played today? What is the meaning of all the formations and parades that we have in the military?

Let us start now to preserve the past so that it will enhance our performance and guide us into the future.

Hampton is the 11th ADA Brigade command sergeant major. This article is based on a speech he gave to a PLDC class at Fort Bliss, Texas.

■ Letters to the Editor

Saving Lives

On September 9, my soldier and friend was killed in a vehicle accident.

That day began, as do all days here in the Sinai, with a driver's safety briefing. My soldier heard this briefing many times. He adhered to the briefing cautions and he knew the reality of driving here. He had been selected as driver of the month just the month before.

As I sat on the plane, taking his remains home to his family, I thought about all of the training and experience I had received. It occurred to me that I never received any training to deal with a situation like this. It is my hope that no one will have to carry the responsibility as a military escort. But, for those who will, my advice is to be honest with the families and yourselves.

Upon my return here, I recalled those "war stories" and the constant safety briefings I received throughout my career. And I remembered soldiers who rolled their eyes, looked at their watches, and shifted back and forth on their heels, hoping that the commander would hurry and finish.

On September 9, safety took on a whole new meaning for me. I attribute my increased safety awareness to the memory of SGT Richard S. Estes.

It is the NCO who enforces standards, to include safety. I ask that you remember SGT Estes when you give those safety briefings and that you impress upon your soldiers how fragile life is.

SSG Darrin M. Adams
Sinai, Egypt

CMB Appeal

I want to voice my opinion and discontent over who qualifies for award of the Combat Medical Badge.

During Operation Desert Storm, there were many medics who served superbly and who deserve the CMB. Unfortunately, they do not fully meet requirements of AR 672-5-1. They have not been awarded the CMB only because they were not "organic to an infantry unit" of brigade or smaller size.

Medics in infantry units are not the only medics who treat wounded soldiers in combat. Certainly, the medic treating wounded tank crew members is just as deserving of recognition as the medic who

treats soldiers of an infantry squad.

Isn't there just a little inequity and partiality in determining CMB eligibility, particularly when considering today's AirLand Battle doctrine where armored units are the Army's primary elements of engagements? I think so!

I am submitting my comments and recommendations to DA. I truly believe that I would be non-supportive of my medical soldiers, as well as other medics who served in Southwest Asia, if I did not take a stand on this issue. If you agree that the regulations are unfair, I encourage you to write your comments on a DA Form 2028 and send it to DA.

CSM Mark A. Barber
Friedberg, Germany

'No Go' on Hitler

So Hitler turned his followers into winners and made their lives meaningful? That's what it says in the article "How Do You Set Their Souls On Fire?" written by MSG John McLennon, in the fall issue.

Sure, MSG McLennon wrote of other leaders and eventually got to his point about NCO leadership. But how on earth could that statement about Hitler and the German people go unedited? Winners? Their lives more meaningful? That was an easily correctable error in fact. Give your editors a "No Go" on that.

SSG Gerald M. Garte
North Carolina Army National Guard

That reference alluded to the fact that Hitler rescued Germany from the effects of the world depression, created a war machine that rejuvenated the economy, gave his "master race" a source of pride and self-worth and ruffled Germans against the punishing mandates of the Treaty of Versailles that ended World War I. His notoriety as a dictator and his responsibility for the slaughter of millions of people are moral issues that do not erase the facts of his accomplishments as a leader.

The Journal — and the profession of soldiering — would be short-sighted and foolish to address only those subjects and personalities that complement our values or do not offend our sensibilities. We can and should learn from the good, the bad and the ugly.

NCO 'Go-Fors'

Despite strides in NCOES and EPMS, too many NCOs are placed in questionable assignments whose major duties (making coffee, running errands, answering phones, erecting tents, etc.) appear to support a continuous zone of comfort and decorum for commanders and their staffs. Such assignments are ill suited to the NCO's level of training and expertise.

Who is responsible for misutilizing NCOs at unit level? Generally, it's the senior NCOs who should be monitoring and accounting for how NCOs — especially junior NCOs — are used. However, such oversight is often non-existent.

If similar malassignments were made in the private sector, the responsible managers would find themselves unemployed. Within the Army, however, such assignments are a widely accepted practice.

Professional development requires that NCOs receive assignments that exploit their experience and potential. Why are we encouraged to assume the "tough jobs" and demanding leadership positions while we also allow NCOs to fill positions that are inconsistent with their MOSes?

Senior NCOs have to share command responsibility for allowing NCOs in their units to be misutilized. They cannot be indifferent about this problem.

The time has come for the movers and shakers in the NCO ranks to put an end to the malassignment of NCOs.

SSG Raymond Christian
Warner Barracks, Germany

NCOs Shined

The NCO Corps deserves a lot of credit for the preparations that led to such a fast and decisive victory in Desert Storm.

NCOs adapted well and ensured that all soldiers were prepared, including newly attached personnel from Reserve and National Guard units. Soldiers were confident in themselves and their equipment because NCOs trained them to standards and took a sincere interest in their welfare.

Efforts to prevent, recognize and deal with environmental injury and stress-related problems were especially successful. The non-battle injury disease (DNBI) rate from the Southwest Asia campaign was .34 per 1,000. That compares to a

DNBI rate of .89 during the Vietnam War. NCOs contributed to that success by stressing personal hygiene and awareness of environmental factors that are disease related.

The NCOs really shined as a result of the way they addressed family issues, helping their soldiers take care of those they left behind and to put their affairs in order.

Not everything was perfect, and after-action reports and studies are addressing these issues. The results will ensure that the future of the United States Army is bright and that soldiers will be highly motivated and well trained because our NCO Corps is innovative and flexible. That should be the most important lesson learned by NCOs.

MSG Jeff Mankoff

Fort Sam Houston, Texas

Mankoff, now with the Academy of Health Sciences, was a Desert Storm first sergeant.

Preserve Discipline

Regarding the new retention standards (physical fitness, drug abuse, weight, etc.), soldiers are getting the message that it won't take much to ruin an Army career.

As NCOs, we should not send the wrong message to our soldiers. The wrong message is that discipline will be sacrificed. But, discipline could suffer as a result of our good intentions. We must resist the urge to look away from discipline problems in hopes of saving a soldier's career. That would only send the message that we've lowered our standards.

Before these standards, a soldier who was half a day late for work might face a company grade Article 15. Now that we know how this could affect his career, we — especially junior NCOs — might tend to minimize such conduct and handle the incident with a counseling statement.

Lowering standards in discipline eventually leads to undermining standards in every other area. NCOs are responsible for enforcing standards to allow the Army to meet its goals. Lowering our standards — even by accident or because of good intentions — is counter-productive.

1SG Daniel E. Powers
Berlin

PT Runs, Programs

Regarding CSM Young's letter on PT runs: She makes a valid point about physiological differences between females and males, but females are making strides and

becoming more physically competitive.

As a graduate of the Master Fitness Course, I was taught that runs should be in ability groups so that all soldiers can achieve their proper training heart rates.

I also suggest that command sergeants major identify capable soldiers who should be master fitness trainers. There are many effective ways that these soldiers can improve a unit's PT program.

SFC Joseph R. Simone
Hanscom Air Force Base, Maine

Con-fused Terms . . .

Reading your fall 1991 issue, I noticed what I think is a mix up in the use of two terms, "det cord," and "time fuse," in the article on page nine, "This Teacher's in Charge."

As a combat engineer and a demolitions instructor, I think SGT Trombley actually said, or at least meant to say, "time fuse," rather than "det cord."

SFC Philip D. Park
Fort Richardson, Alaska

. . . Spooling Around

There is no measureable time difference between separate spools of "det cord" when they are used. However, there is a difference between spools of "time fuse." When a new spool of time fuse is opened, you cut off a length and do a test burn. Correctly done, charges will not go off 40 seconds early.

SFC George F. Foy
Fort Hood, Texas

Ordnance School experts say both sergeants are correct. The Journal incorrectly used the wrong terms. However, the point made by the story remains: Trombley is a good NCO who knows exactly what he is doing.

Nostalgic Notes

I have just entered my 25th year of retirement from the Army.

While attending the Association of the U.S. Army annual meeting in Washington, D.C., I stopped at the Sergeants Major Academy display. I was impressed by the magnitude of change in the NCO development and educational programs that have taken place. I also picked up a copy of the fall NCO Journal, and I have read it from cover to cover. As I read the articles . . . the thought ran through my mind that the more

things change, the more they remain the same. The essence of each article was just as true when I was on active duty, as it will be as true many years hence.

I hope, that as part of the motivation the Army provides for succeeding in NCOES courses, that it includes an equation of civilian vs. military leadership . . . I see the same relationship between leadership in the military and leadership in the civilian sector. I'm sure that many NCOs stay in service with the goal of retiring into a second career, as I did. The value of their education and experience in the Army will prove to be a definite plus in pursuit of that second career. . . . Success in that second career will be assured and rewarding. Never did I realize how similar the military organization was to the civilian; the Army, after all, is another giant corporation. The only things generally lacking, though, are the esprit, the camaraderie and the degree of two-way loyalty that you have become accustomed to in the Army.

I also suggest that NCOs preserve their ties with the Army after they leave, rather than try to make a clean break with the past, as so many do . . . I can't explain how much it means now to be able to occasionally meet and spend time with so many people with whom I share a common bond. The esprit and the camaraderie are always recalled. And there are days when I contemplate my past and present and thank God that what I have done in my second career is not all I ever did with my life.

1SG (Ret.) Jim Clinton
Old Bethpage, N.Y.

'Cooker' vs. 'Cooler'

The Army should replace the current all weather cap — the "cooker" — with a ventilated softball cap — a "cooler".

The current cap is too hot in most locations during much of the year. I think that troops would welcome a cooler cap for wear during the summer.

The cost of a ventilated softball cap is \$2.75, and it's made in the U.S.A.

MSG William E. Vild
Baden, Penn.

According to DA Logistics officials, ventilated caps do not offer enough protection from sun, wind and dust. A Soldier Enhancement Program project, however, is under way to evaluate a cap with lighter fabric, earflaps removed, a sweat band added and with a more durable bill.

■ Book Reviews

This Kind of War

By
T.R. Fehrenbach

*Rantam Books, 1991,
687 pages, \$5.95*

This Kind of War, A Study in Unpreparedness, has stimulated controversy ever since its first printing by the Macmillan Company in 1963.

Based on personal narratives of unit leaders who served in the Korean War, the book begins with the North Korean invasion and runs through the peace negotiations at Panmunjong. It recounts the major battles, defeats and victories seen through the eyes of the participants. As a result, it is a highly readable account — as hard to put down as any well-written novel.

But **This Kind of War** doesn't end with conflicts resolved and returning heroes.

Rather, it insists that America was unprepared for the war and builds a strong case for the importance of tough training, the best equipment and a leadership that looks out for its soldiers.

His first vivid example of the consequences of unpreparedness is the account of Task Force Smith, a hastily organized unit sent into combat as an undermanned force with weapons and communications equipment that didn't work, no resupply and inadequate ammunition. Airlifted from Japan to stop the North Korean army that had swept across the 38th parallel, Task Force Smith delayed the enemy only seven hours. Of the 406 Americans who began the defense, only 250 survived.

The author accuses Army leaders of failing to adequately train soldiers and says soldiers lacked the toughness to survive. Support for his point of view comes from the veterans themselves.

In the light of this, the book's main point is valid: To send into battle soldiers who are untrained and physically and psychologically unfit is no better than murder and it is the leader's task to teach his soldiers to suffer, fight, kill and die.

MSG Gil High

Operation Just Cause A Soldier's Eyewitness Account

By
H.T. Clarence L. Briggs III
*Stackpole Books, 1990
143 pages, \$10.95*

Briggs, a former NCO who served in Vietnam, shoots from the hip and writes a clear, convincing case for closer study and better training of rules of engagement.

His first-person account of **Operation Just Cause** details the dilemmas, confusion and frustration soldiers faced in Panama: While rules of engagement rapidly changed, soldiers found it difficult to determine who was or was not the enemy.

His account addresses the stages of the operation, from preparation and planning

to the post-fighting role of helping Panamanians return to normal lives. He also addresses dishonorable behavior by soldiers, such as patch-hunting brass who bumped mission-essential soldiers off of critical deployment flights.

Low-intensity and urban conflicts and rapidly changing battlefields might be the norm of future U.S. military actions. This book will give NCOs a firm understanding of what to expect from such actions, especially when confronting delicate situations involving civilians and paramilitary forces whose status as friend or foe is, at best, a guess. It should also prompt readers to evaluate their values and how they would respond if they were in the situations this book relates.

Despite a tendency to portray soldiers in his unit as being better than those in other units, Briggs makes a sincere attempt to "tell it like it is." He doesn't avoid incidents of friendly fire or confusion that show our imperfections and sometimes stupid mistakes.

SGM Bill Lopez

Reflections of a Warrior

By
CSM Franklin D. Miller

*Presidio Press, 1991,
205 pages, \$19.95*

Miller's autobiography centers on his experiences during six consecutive years in Vietnam and the events for which he received the Medal of Honor. But his book is not an attempt to "set the record straight," or "tell it the way it was." Instead, Miller's first purpose is to entertain while sharing his perspective on the life of a combat soldier. His cocky style of storytelling captures the reader's imagination, taking us deep into every experience. Reading this book is like sitting around a field stove and hearing a fellow soldier relive his wartime escapades.

Beginning with a description of his arrival at Tan Son Nhut Air Base that will sound familiar to most Vietnam veterans, Miller moves into a chronological account of his first days in-country then continues by jumping back and forth through the years as he recalls the danger, the boredom and even some of the fun and laughter he experienced while serving in Vietnam.

Miller takes us through every encounter — in battle and in the ville — with meticulous detail. While some might say his style is arrogant, no one can deny the narrator is a sincere and caring person. He shares his feelings in a way that readers can relate to. He speaks of bravado in one passage, then tells of his innermost fears in the next. Just as you begin to dislike him for his brutal honesty, he exposes his soft side.

The Army is one of few organizations where friendships become bonded under extreme circumstances. Miller tells of the bonds he made and the friendships and loyalty for these friends he still feels today. To know Miller is to understand him, and this book attempts to let you do just that.

(Miller is currently serving with the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii.)

SGM Steven A. Tew



Wheeler Field – Dec. 7, 1941

