

T221

Risk Management

DEC 03

U.S. ARMY SERGEANTS MAJOR ACADEMY

Primary Leadership Development Course
(PLDC)

The Army Training System

TRAINING SUPPORT PACKAGE



"NO ONE IS MORE PROFESSIONAL THAN I"

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TRAINING SUPPORT PACKAGE (TSP)

TSP Number / Title	T221 / RISK MANAGEMENT
Effective Date	01 Dec 2003
Supersedes TSP(s) / Lesson(s)	T221, Risk Management, Oct 2003
TSP Users	400-PLDC, Primary Leadership Development Course
Proponent	The proponent for this document is the Sergeants Major Academy.
Improvement Comments	<p>Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028, <i>Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms</i>. Completed forms, or equivalent response, will be mailed or attached to electronic e-mail and transmitted to:</p> <p>COMDT USASMA ATTN ATSS DCP BLDG 11291 BIGGS FIELD FORT BLISS TX 79918-8002</p> <p>Telephone (Comm) (915) 568-8875 Telephone (DSN) 978-8875 E-mail: atss-dcd@bliss.army.mil</p>
Security Clearance / Access	Unclassified
Foreign Disclosure Restrictions	FD5. This product/publication has been reviewed by the product developers in coordination with the USASMA foreign disclosure authority. This product is releasable to students from all requesting foreign countries without restrictions.

PREFACE

Purpose

This Training Support Package provides the instructor with a standardized lesson plan for presenting instruction for:

Task Number

Task Title

Individual

154-385-6263

Conduct a Risk Assessment

154-385-6465

Employ the Risk Assessment Process During Mission Planning

This TSP
Contains

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**RISK MANAGEMENT
T221 / Version 1
01 Dec 2003**

SECTION I. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

All Courses Including This Lesson	<u>Course Number</u>	<u>Version</u>	<u>Course Title</u>
	400-PLDC	1	Primary Leadership Development Course

Task(s) Taught(*) or Supported	<u>Task Number</u>	<u>Task Title</u>
	<u>Individual</u>	
	154-385-6263	Conduct a Risk Assessment
	154-385-6465	Employ the Risk Assessment Process During Mission Planning

Reinforced Task(s)	<u>Task Number</u>	<u>Task Title</u>

Academic Hours	The academic hours required to teach this lesson are as follows:	
	<u>Resident Hours/Methods</u>	
	1 hr 15 mins / Conference / Discussion 35 mins / Practical Exercise (Performance)	
Test	0 hrs	
Test Review	0 hrs	
Total Hours:	2 hrs	

Test Lesson Number	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Lesson No.</u>
Testing (to include test review)	3	WE01

Prerequisite Lesson(s)	<u>Lesson Number</u>	<u>Lesson Title</u>
	None	

Clearance Access	Security Level: Unclassified Requirements: There are no clearance or access requirements for the lesson.
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Foreign Disclosure Restrictions	FD5. This product/publication has been reviewed by the product developers in coordination with the USASMA foreign disclosure authority. This product is releasable to students from all requesting foreign countries without restrictions.
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References													
	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th><u>Number</u></th> <th><u>Title</u></th> <th><u>Date</u></th> <th><u>Additional Information</u></th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>FM 100-14</td> <td>RISK MANAGEMENT</td> <td>23 Apr 1998</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>FM 3-20.98</td> <td>RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON</td> <td>02 Dec 2002</td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Additional Information</u>	FM 100-14	RISK MANAGEMENT	23 Apr 1998		FM 3-20.98	RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON	02 Dec 2002	
<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Additional Information</u>										
FM 100-14	RISK MANAGEMENT	23 Apr 1998											
FM 3-20.98	RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON	02 Dec 2002											

Student Study Assignments

Before class--

- Read the Student Handouts.

During class--

- Participate in classroom discussions, and complete PE-1.

After class--

- Turn in recoverable reference materials after the examination for this lesson.
-

Instructor Requirements

1:8, SSG, PLDC graduate, ITC and SGITC qualified.

Additional Support Personnel Requirements

<u>Name</u>	<u>Stu Ratio</u>	<u>Qty</u>	<u>Man Hours</u>
None			

Equipment Required for Instruction

<u>ID Name</u>	<u>Stu Ratio</u>	<u>Instr Ratio</u>	<u>Spt</u>	<u>Qty</u>	<u>Exp</u>
441-06 LCD Projection System	1:16	1:2	N	1	N
559359 SCREEN PROJECTION	1:16	1:2	N	1	N
673000T101700 PROJECTOR, OVERHEAD, 3M	1:16	1:2	N	1	N
7110-00-132-6651 CHALKBOARD	1:16	1:2	N	1	N
7110-00-T81-1805 DRY ERASE BOARD	1:16	1:2	N	1	N

Materials Required**Instructor Materials:**

- VGTs-15
- Chalk and eraser.

Student Materials:

- Pencils and writing paper.
 - Reading material listed on the advance sheet.
-

Classroom, Training Area, and Range Requirements

GEN INSTRUCT BLDG (CLASSROOM SIZE40X40 PER 16 STU)

Ammunition Requirements

<u>Id</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Exp</u>	<u>Stu Ratio</u>	<u>Instr Ratio</u>	<u>Spt Qty</u>
None					

**Instructional
Guidance**

NOTE: Before presenting this lesson, instructors must thoroughly prepare by studying this lesson and identified reference material.

This TSP requires one small group leader (SGL) who meets the requirements listed in the Course Management Plan. In addition the SGL will--

- Read all TSP material.
- Conduct the class in accordance with this TSP.
- Collect all recoverable materials after the examination for this lesson.

**Proponent
Lesson Plan
Approvals**

<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Date</u>
Santa Barbara, Robert A.	GS-09	Training Specialist	
Berta, Frank W.	GS-09	Chief, PLDC	
Lawson, Brian H.	SGM	Chief, NCOES	
Lemon, Marion	SGM	Chief, CDDD	

SECTION II. INTRODUCTION

Method of Instruction: <u>Conference / Discussion</u>
Technique of Delivery: <u>Small Group Instruction (SGI)</u>
Instructor to Student Ratio is: <u>1:8</u>
Time of Instruction: <u>5 mins</u>
Media: <u>None</u>

Motivator

Soldiering is tough, demanding, and risky. It has a high potential for danger; soldiering is not for the faint of heart. Soldiering attracts men and women with the "can do" and warfighting spirit. This means we take risks and don't shrink from responsibility. Risk management is a process that assists decision makers in reducing or offsetting risk by systematically identifying, assessing, and controlling risk arising from operational factors and making decisions that weigh risks against mission benefits. Since the Korean War, United States forces have suffered more losses from non-combat causes than from enemy action. Key factors contributing to those losses include--

- rapidly changing operational environment,
- high operational tempo and a high personnel tempo,
- equipment failure,
- support failure,
- effects of the physical environment, and human factors.

Accidents took a heavy toll of US Army resources during operation Desert Shield/Storm, causing over half of the deaths. As a result of Desert Shield/Storm, we had to rethink the role of safety in combat. After safety experts analyzed the accidents, they found that the same accidents soldiers had in peacetime occurred in combat. Because we train as we fight, we must place great emphasis on training safely.

Terminal Learning Objective

NOTE: Inform the students of the following Terminal Learning Objective requirements.
At the completion of this lesson, you [the student] will:

Action:	Implement the risk management process in order to minimize the frequency and severity of accidents in the activities you lead.
Conditions:	In a classroom environment and in an STX while serving as a leader.
Standards:	Implemented the risk management process in order to minimize the frequency and severity of accidents: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Identifying the basic principles for implementing the risk management process.• Identifying the five steps of the risk management process.• Identifying the causes and effects of fratricide.• Conducting a risk assessment for training activities you will lead. IAW FM 100-14 and FM 3-20.98

Safety Requirements

None

Risk Assessment Level

Low

Environmental Considerations

NOTE: It is the responsibility of all soldiers and DA civilians to protect the environment from damage.

None

Evaluation

At the conclusion of this course you will take a written examination. The examination will contain questions from this lesson. You must correctly answer 70 percent or more of the questions on the examination to receive a GO. You will also conduct a risk assessment on two of the training activities you will lead, one during a physical training activity and one during a classroom activity.

NOTE: Inform the students of where their examinations will take place as posted on the training schedule and when they will receive feedback on the tests. Include any retest information. Inform the students that they must turn in all recoverable reference materials after the examination. During this lesson, the students will complete one practical exercise.

**Instructional
Lead-In**

In every combat mission, there is a fight with two enemies. One is the declared enemy, the threat to national security. The other enemy is human error. It watches us, and it waits. It singles out individual soldiers and equipment: an aircraft perhaps, a tank, an artillery crew, or a truck driver. Then it strikes and brings terrible effects. It sneaks up on us in indirect ways, plays on our peace of mind, and often attacks without warning. The process you will learn today will help you defeat both enemies during war or in peace.

SECTION III. PRESENTATION

NOTE: Inform the students of the Enabling Learning Objective requirements.

A. ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVE

ACTION:	Identify the basic principles for implementing the risk management process.
CONDITIONS:	In a classroom environment and in an STX while serving as a leader.
STANDARDS:	Identified the basic principles for implementing the risk management process, IAW FM 100-14.

1. Learning Step / Activity 1. Principles of Risk Management


Method of Instruction: Conference / Discussion
 Technique of Delivery: Small Group Instruction (SGI)
 Instructor to Student Ratio: 1:8
 Time of Instruction: 10 mins
 Media: VGT-1 thru VGT-3

Basic Principles

The fundamental goal of risk management is to enhance operational capabilities and mission accomplishment, with minimal acceptable loss. The basic principles that provide the framework for implementing the risk management process are--

- Integrating risk management into mission, planning, preparation, and execution.
- Making risk decisions at the appropriate level in the chain of command.
- Accepting no unnecessary risk.

SHOW VGT-1, BASIC PRINCIPLES



Ref: FM 100-14, p 1-3

NOTE: Have students turn to SH-2, p 1-3 (FM 100-14). Read and discuss each of the principles.


REMOVE VGT-1

Applicability

Risk management applies to all situations and environments across the wide range of Army operations, activities, and processes. The next two visual aids summarize the key aspects of risk management for commanders and leaders.

NOTE: As you show the next two visual aids, ask the students what they think their role is in each of the actions.


SHOW VGT-2, RISK MANAGEMENT ASSISTS THE COMMANDER OR LEADER IN--



Ref: FM 100-14, Fig 1-2, p 1-4

REMOVE VGT-2

SHOW VGT-3, RISK MANAGEMENT DOES NOT--



Ref: FM 100-14, Fig 1-2, p 1-4

Nor does it justify shortcuts in
REMOVE VGT-3

Constraints

Risk management does not give you the authority to violate the law-of-land-warfare, or deliberately disobey local, state, national, or host nation laws. It does not justify ignoring regulatory restrictions and applicable standards. Risk management does not justify bypassing risk controls required by law, such as safety and fire protection codes. Nor does it justify shortcuts in physical security, transport and disposal of hazardous material and waste, or storage of classified material.

Risk management assists the commander in complying with regulatory and legal requirements by--

- Identifying applicable legal standards that affect the mission.
- Identifying alternate courses of action or alternate standards that meet the intent of the law.
- Ensuring better use of limited resources through establishing priorities to correct known hazardous conditions.

CHECK ON LEARNING:

NOTE: Check on learning by asking the following or similar questions. Briefly summarize the covered material and correct misunderstandings the students may have.

QUESTION: What are the basic principles for implementing the risk management process?

ANSWER:

- Integrate risk management into mission planning, preparation, and execution.
- Make risk decisions at the appropriate level in the chain of command.
- Accept no unnecessary risk.

Ref: FM 100-14, p 1-3

QUESTION: What is the applicability of risk management?

ANSWER: Risk management applies to all situations and environments across the wide range of Army operations, activities, and processes.

Ref: FM 100-14, p 1-4

B. ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVE

ACTION:	Identify the five steps of the risk management process.
CONDITIONS:	In a classroom environment and a STX, given FM 100-14.
STANDARDS:	Identified the five steps of the risk management process IAW FM 100-14.

1. Learning Step / Activity 1. Risk Management Process

Method of Instruction: Conference / Discussion
Technique of Delivery: Small Group Instruction (SGI)
Instructor to Student Ratio: 1:8
Time of Instruction: 35 mins
Media: VGT-4 thru VGT-10

The Five-Step Risk Management Process

Risk management is the process of identifying and controlling hazards to conserve combat power and resources. We will now discuss the five steps of the risk management process.

SHOW VGT-4, THE FIVE STEPS

THE FIVE STEPS

- STEP 1. IDENTIFY HAZARDS.
- STEP 2. ASSESS HAZARDS TO DETERMINE RISKS.
- STEP 3. DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE RISK DECISIONS.
- STEP 4. IMPLEMENT CONTROLS.
- STEP 5. SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE.

T221/JAN04/ VGT-4

Ref: FM 100-14, p 2-0


The risk management process integrates the five-step process into the military decision-making process.

NOTE: Have students turn to SH-2, (FM 100-14) p 2-0 and review. Briefly discuss figure 2-1 on SH-2, (FM 100-14) p 2-1 to see the correlation between the risk management process and the military decision-making process.

REMOVE VGT-4

There are two types of risk that exist across the wide range of Army operations, tactical risk and accident risks.

SHOW VGT-5, TWO TYPES OF RISKS



Ref: FM 100-14, p 2-2

NOTE: Briefly discuss the difference between the two types of risk.

REMOVE VGT-5

Now that we understand the types of risks, let's discuss the five steps, in detail, as they apply to risk assessment.

Step 1 and Step 2 of the risk management process make up the actual risk assessment. It is during these steps that commanders and leaders identify the hazards (Step 1) and then determine the direct impact of each hazard (Step 2). Steps 3 through 5 are the essential follow-through actions to effectively manage risk. Look at Step 1.

SHOW VGT-6, RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS STEP ONE



Ref: FM 100-14, pp 2-2 thru 2-7

A hazard is an actual or potential condition where the following can occur:


- Injury, illness, or death.
- Damage to or loss of equipment and property.
- Mission degradation.

NOTE: Civil considerations were added after FM 100-14 was published.

Commanders and leaders use METT-TC factors as a framework for identifying hazards when planning, preparing and executing operations. When applying risk management to METT-TC during mission analysis, leaders and staffs should look for hazards that affect both tactical and accident risks. They must identify all hazards that may present significant risks to the mission.

REMOVE VGT-6

SHOW VGT-7, RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS STEP TWO



Ref: FM 100-14, pp 2-7 thru 2-13

Leaders and staffs assess each hazard in relation to the probability of a hazardous incident, in other words how likely it is that incident will occur.

NOTE: Have students turn to SH-2, (Fm 100-14) pp 2-8 and 2-9 and review the Hazard Probability chart in Figure 2-2.

Substep B addresses the severity of each hazard, which the commander then expresses in terms of--

- Degree of injury or illness.
- Loss or damage to equipment or property.
- Environmental damage.
- Other mission-impairing factors such as lost combat power.

NOTE: Have students turn to SH-2, (FM 100-14) p 2-10 to review and discuss Figure 2-3, Hazard Severity.

In Substep C leaders and staffs must expand on what they understand about probable hazardous incidents into estimates of levels of risk for each identified hazard and an estimate of the overall risk for the operation. They would use the Risk Assessment Matrix to assist them in summarizing this assessment.

NOTE: Have students turn to SH-2, (FM 100-14) p 2-11 to review and discuss the Risk Assessment Matrix.

REMOVE VGT-7

SHOW VGT-8, RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS STEP THREE



Ref: FM 100-14, pp 2-13 thru 2-16

You accomplish Step 3 in two substeps: develop controls and make risk decisions. After assessing each hazard, leaders develop controls that either eliminate the hazard or reduce the risk (probability and/or severity) of a hazardous incident. They consider the reason for the hazard, not just the hazard itself.

Controls can take many forms, but fall into three basic categories.

QUESTION: What are the three categories?

ANSWER:

- Educational controls--based on the knowledge and skills of the units and individuals.
- Physical controls--barriers, guards, or signs to warn individuals and units that a hazard exists.
- Avoidance--actions taken to prevent contact with an identified hazard.

Ref: FM 100-14, p 2-14

QUESTION: What criteria must the controls meet to be effective?

ANSWER:

- Suitability--it must remove the hazard or reduce the residual risk to an acceptable level.
- Feasibility--the unit must have the capability to implement the control.
- Acceptability--the benefit gained by implementing the control must justify the cost in resources and time.

Ref: FM 100-14, p 2-14

The last thing to consider in this substep is residual risk.

QUESTION: What is residual risk?


ANSWER: It is the risk remaining after selecting controls for the hazard.

Ref: FM 100-14, p 2-16

You determine the overall residual risk of a mission when you identify more than one hazard. Each of these hazards may have a different level and you determine the overall residual mission risk based on the incident having the greatest residual risk.

REMOVE VGT-8

SHOW VGT-9, RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS STEP FOUR




Ref: FM 100-14, p 2-17

Leaders and staffs integrate controls into SOPs, written and verbal orders, mission briefings, and staff estimates. The critical check for this step is to ensure that they convert the controls into clear, simple execution orders understood at all levels.

REMOVE VGT-9

Now we will discuss the last step in the risk management process.

SHOW VGT-10, RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS, STEP FIVE



Ref: FM 100-14, pp 2-17 thru 2-19

Leaders supervise mission rehearsal and execution to ensure enforcement of standards and controls. Techniques may include spot-checks, inspections, situation reports and brief-backs, buddy checks and close supervision. You must continually

assess variable hazards such as fatigue, equipment serviceability, and the environment and modify controls to keep risks at an acceptable level.

After a mission, leaders and individuals evaluate how well they executed the risk-management process.

NOTE: Have the students turn to SH-2, (FM 100-14) pp 2-18 and 2-19 and read the bullets about evaluating the risk management process. Then as a final review, turn to SH-2, (FM 100-14) p 2-20 and discuss Figure 2-7, Continuous Application of Risk Management.

REMOVE VGT-10

BREAK TIME: 00:50 to 01:00

2. Learning Step / Activity 2. Practical Exercise

Method of Instruction: Practical Exercise (Performance)
Technique of Delivery: Small Group Instruction (SGI)
Instructor to Student Ratio: 1:8
Time of Instruction: 30 mins
Media: PE-1

Practical Exercise

The next 30 minutes of this lesson is a non-graded practical exercise where you will complete a risk management worksheet.

NOTE: Pass out the practical exercise and explain the procedures outline on PE-1. Break the class into groups of 3 to 4 students and allow 15 minutes to complete the exercise, then, allow 15 minutes to discuss the answers. Tell the students they must select one person from the group to brief their solution. Have one student from each group read the answers from that group. After all the groups have presented their solutions, pass out SPE-1.

3. Learning Step / Activity 3. Conduct a Risk Assessment

Method of Instruction: Practical Exercise (Performance)
Technique of Delivery: Small Group Instruction (SGI)
Instructor to Student Ratio: 1:8
Time of Instruction: 5 mins
Media: None

Conduct a Risk Assessment

NOTE: Inform the students that they will do a risk assessment on two training exercises that they will conduct later in this course. The risk assessment will be part of the evaluation for those exercises.

C. ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVE

ACTION:	Identify the causes and effects of fratricide.
CONDITIONS:	Given a classroom environment.
STANDARDS:	Identified the main causes and the contributing factors of fratricide IAW FM 3-20.98.

1. Learning Step / Activity 1. Identify Causes and Effects of Fratricide.

Method of Instruction: Conference / Discussion
Technique of Delivery: Small Group Instruction (SGI)
Instructor to Student Ratio: 1:8
Time of Instruction: 10 mins
Media: VGT-11 thru VGT-15

Fratricide


NOTE: Have students follow along in SH-3 (FM 3-20.98).

QUESTION: What is the definition of fratricide?

NOTE: Ask the student body for a response before providing the answer.

ANSWER: See VGT-11.

SHOW VGT-11, FRATRICIDE DEFINED



Ref: FM 3-20.98, p I-1

REMOVE VGT-11

Fratricide prevention is the commander's responsibility. You and all leaders across all operating systems assist in accomplishing this mission. This portion of the lesson focuses on actions leaders can take with current resources to reduce the risk of fratricide. Situational awareness on the part of all leaders is critical not only to

mission success but also to survival. In any tactical situation, it is critical that you know where other friendly elements are operating. With this knowledge, you can anticipate dangerous conditions and take steps to either avoid or mitigate them. Leaders must always be vigilant of changes and developments in the situation that may place their elements in danger. They must also ensure that all section or squad positions constantly report to higher headquarters so that all other friendly elements are aware of where they are and what they are doing. At company and battalion level, they can designate no-fire areas to control friendly, direct, and indirect fire into an area in which friendly personnel are or will be operating. When a leader perceives a potential fratricide situation, he must personally use the higher echelon net to coordinate directly with the friendly element involved.


The Role of Training

The underlying principle of fratricide prevention is simple: leaders, who know where their soldiers are and where they want them to fire, can keep those soldiers alive to kill the enemy. At the same time, leaders must avoid at all costs any reluctance to employ, integrate, and synchronize all required operating systems at the critical time and place. They must avoid becoming tentative out of fear of fratricide; rather, they strive to eliminate fratricide risk through tough, realistic, combined arms training in which each soldier and unit achieves the established standard. Training allows units and soldiers to make mistakes, with the goal of reducing or eliminating the risk of errors occurring in combat. A key role of a training program is to teach soldiers which targets to engage and when to engage them. Just as important, soldiers must learn and practice restraint in what and when to engage; for example, every commander must know to confirm the target as hostile before issuing and executing any fire command. Eliminating the risk of fratricide is no less critical as a training standard than are other mission requirements. All leaders must know all aspects of the applicable training standard, including fratricide prevention, and then ensure that their soldiers train to that standard.

Effects of Fratricide

Fratricide causes you unacceptable losses and increases the risk of mission failure; it almost always affects the unit's ability to survive and function. Units experiencing fratricide suffer these consequences:

SHOW VGT-12, EFFECTS OF FRATRICIDE




Ref: FM 3-20.98, p I-2

NOTE: Select a student or students to read the bullets.

REMOVE VGT-12

SHOW VGT-13, EFFECTS OF FRATRICIDE (Cont)



Ref: FM 3-20.98, p I-2


As you can see, the consequences can definitely have a grave impact upon you, your soldiers, and your unit.

REMOVE VGT-13

Now let's discuss some of the causes of fratricide.

You, as a leader, must identify any of the following factors that may affect your unit and then strive to eliminate or correct them.

SHOW VGT-14, CAUSES OF FRATRICIDE



Ref: FM 3-20.98, pp I-3 and I-4

Failures in the Direct Fire Control Plan

These occur when units do not develop effective fire control plans, particularly in the offense. Units may fail to designate target engagement areas or adhere to target priorities, or they may position their weapons incorrectly. Under such conditions, fire discipline often breaks down upon contact.

Land Navigation Failures

Units often stray out of assigned sectors, report wrong locations, and become disoriented. Much less frequently, they employ fire support weapons from the wrong locations. In either type of situation, units that unexpectedly encounter an errant unit may fire their weapons at the friendly force.

Failures in Combat Identification


Vehicle commanders and gunners cannot accurately identify thermal or optical signatures near the maximum range of their systems. In limited visibility, units within that range may mistake one another for the enemy.

Inadequate Control Measures

Units may fail to disseminate the minimum necessary maneuver fire control measures and fire support coordination measures; they may also fail to tie control measures to recognizable terrain or events. When this happens, synchronization fails.

REMOVE VGT-14

SHOW VGT-15, CAUSES OF FRATRICIDE (Cont)



Ref: FM 3-20.98, pp I-3 and I-4

Failures in Reporting and Communications

Units at all levels may fail to generate timely, accurate, and complete reports as locations and tactical situations change. This distorts the tactical "picture" available at each level and can lead to erroneous clearance of supporting fires.

Weapons Errors

Lapses in individual discipline can result in fratricide. These incidents include charge errors, accidental discharges, mistakes with explosives and hand grenades, and use of incorrect gun data.

Battlefield Hazards

A variety of explosive devices and materiel may create danger on the battlefield. These include unexploded ordnance, unmarked or unrecorded minefields (including scatterable mines), and booby traps. Your failure to mark, record, remove, or otherwise anticipate these threats will lead to casualties.

Reliance On Instruments

A unit that relies too heavily on systems such the FBCB2 and GPS devices will find its capabilities severely degraded if these systems fail. The unit will be unable to maintain situational awareness.

REMOVE VGT-15

Let's review some methods of prevention. The measures we are about to discuss provide a guide to actions for you to take to reduce and/or prevent fratricide risk. These guidelines are not directive in nature, nor intended to restrict initiative. Commanders and leaders must learn to apply them as appropriate based on the specific situation and METT-TC factors. At the heart of fratricide reduction and prevention are five key principles:

- **Identify and assess potential fratricide risks in the estimate of the situation.** Express these risks in the OPORD and/or applicable FRAGOs.
- **Maintain situational awareness.** Focus on such areas as current intelligence; unit locations/dispositions; denial areas (minefields/scatterable mines); contaminated areas, such as ICM and NBC; SITREPs; and METT-TC factors.
- **Ensure positive target identification.** Review vehicle and weapons identification (ID) cards. Become familiar with the characteristics of potential friendly and enemy vehicles, including their silhouettes and thermal signatures. Know at what ranges and under what conditions positive identification of various vehicles and weapons is possible.
- **Maintain effective fire control.** Ensure fire commands are accurate, concise, and clearly stated. Make it mandatory for crewmen to ask for clarification of any

portion of the fire command that they do not completely understand. Stress the importance of the chain of command in the fire control process; ensure crewmen get in the habit of obtaining target confirmation and permission to fire from their leaders before engaging targets they assume are enemy elements.

- **Establish a command climate that emphasizes fratricide prevention.** Enforce fratricide prevention measures, placing special emphasis on the use of doctrinally sound tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Ensure constant supervision in the execution of orders and in the performance of all tasks and missions to standard.

Ref: FM 3-20.98, pp I-6 and I-7

In conclusion, you must be ready to take immediate actions to prevent friendly casualties as well as damage or destruction of friendly equipment.

CHECK ON LEARNING:

NOTE: Conduct a check on learning by asking the following or similar questions. Briefly summarize the covered material and correct any misunderstanding the students may have.

QUESTION: What are the causes of fratricide?

ANSWER: Failures in the direct fire control plan, land and navigation failures, failures in combat identification, inadequate control measures, failures in reporting and communications, weapons errors, and battlefield hazards.

Ref: FM 3-20.98, pp I-3 and I-4

QUESTION: What are the key principles to fratricide reduction and prevention?

ANSWER: Identify and assess potential fratricide risks, maintain situational awareness. Ensure positive target identification, maintain effective fire control, and establish a command climate that emphasizes fratricide prevention.

Ref: FM 3-20.98, pp I-6 and I-7

SECTION IV. SUMMARY

Method of Instruction: <u>Conference / Discussion</u>
Technique of Delivery: <u>Small Group Instruction (SGI)</u>
Instructor to Student Ratio is: <u>1:8</u>
Time of Instruction: <u>5 mins</u>
Media: <u>None</u>

Check on Learning

QUESTION: What is risk management?

ANSWER: Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance the risk costs with mission benefits.

Ref: FM 100-14, p 1-1

QUESTION: What are the basic principles for implementing the risk management process?

ANSWER:

- Integrating risk management into mission planning, preparation, and execution.
- Making risk decisions at the appropriate level in the chain of command.
- Accepting no unnecessary risk.

Ref: FM 100-14, p 1-3

Review / Summarize Lesson

If we are comfortably safe in peacetime, must we defer tough, realistic training? Of course not, but we must decide when it is prudent to crawl as opposed to walking or running in our training sessions. Risk management is not risk elimination. The only way to eliminate risk is to stop training. It's important to discover a potential risk, assess its impact on operations, decide where and when the risk is acceptable, and take action to reduce or eliminate the risk. Leaders must know and use the risk assessment/management process.

SECTION V. STUDENT EVALUATION

Testing Requirements

NOTE: Describe how the student must demonstrate accomplishment of the TLO. Refer student to the Student Evaluation Plan.

You will take a written examination. The examination will contain some questions from this lesson. You must answer correctly 70 percent or more of the questions on the examination to receive a GO.

Feedback Requirements


NOTE: Feedback is essential to effective learning. Schedule and provide feedback on the evaluation and any information to help answer students' questions about the test. Provide remedial training as needed.

NOTE: Inform the students of where the examination will take place as posted on the training schedule and when they will receive feedback on the test. Include any retest information. Inform the students that they must turn in all recoverable reference material after the examination.

Enabling Learning Objective A

Learning Step 1

VGT-1, Basic Principles



**RISK MANAGEMENT ASSISTS THE COMMANDER
OR LEADER IN--**

- **CONSERVING LIVES AND RESOURCES AND AVOIDING UNNECESSARY RISK.**
- **MAKING AN INFORMED DECISION TO IMPLEMENT A COA.**
- **IDENTIFYING FEASIBLE AND EFFECTIVE CONTROL MEASURES WHERE SPECIFIC STANDARDS DO NOT EXIST.**
- **PROVIDING REASONABLE ALTERNATIVES FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.**

T221/JAN04/ VGT-2

RISK MANAGEMENT DOES NOT--

- **INHIBIT THE COMMANDER'S AND LEADER'S FLEXIBILITY AND INITIATIVE.**
- **REMOVE RISK ALTOGETHER, OR SUPPORT A ZERO DEFECTS MINDSET.**
- **REQUIRE A GO/NO-GO DECISION.**
- **SANCTION OR JUSTIFY VIOLATING THE LAW.**
- **REMOVE THE NECESSITY FOR STANDARD DRILLS, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES.**

T221/JAN04/ VGT-3

Enabling Learning Objective B

Learning Step 1

VGT-4, The Five Steps

THE FIVE STEPS

- **STEP 1. IDENTIFY HAZARDS.**
- **STEP 2. ASSESS HAZARDS TO DETERMINE RISKS.**
- **STEP 3. DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE RISK DECISIONS.**
- **STEP 4. IMPLEMENT CONTROLS.**
- **STEP 5. SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE.**

T221/JAN04/ VGT-4


TWO TYPES OF RISKS

- **TACTICAL RISK** – RISK CONCERNED WITH HAZARDS THAT EXIST BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF EITHER THE ENEMY OR AN ADVERSARY. IT APPLIES TO ALL LEVELS OF WAR AND ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF OPERATIONS.
- **ACCIDENT RISK** – INCLUDES ALL OPERATIONAL RISK CONSIDERATIONS OTHER THAN TACTICAL RISK. IT INCLUDES RISKS TO THE FRIENDLY FORCE. IT ALSO INCLUDES RISKS POSED TO CIVILIANS BY AN OPERATION, AS WELL AS AN OPERATIONS IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENT.

T221/JAN04/ VGT-5

RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS

Step One



T221/JAN04/ VGT-6

RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS

Step Two

Assess Hazards to Determine Risks

**Sub-Step A: Assess Hazard
Probability**

|

**Sub-Step B: Assess Hazard
Severity**

|

Sub-Step C: Estimate Risk Levels

T221/JAN04/ VGT-7

RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS

Step Three


Develop Controls and Make Risk Decisions

Develop Controls

Make Risk Decisions

T221/JAN04/ VGT-8


RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS Step Four



T221/JAN04/ VGT-9

RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS Step Five

Supervise and Evaluate



T221/JAN04/ VGT-10

Enabling Learning Objective C

Learning Step 1

VGT-11, Fratricide Defined

FRATRICIDE DEFINED



“...the employment of friendly weapons that results in the unforeseen and unintentional death or injury of friendly personnel or damage to friendly equipment.”



(FM 3-20.98)



T221/JAN04/VGT-11

EFFECTS OF FRATRICIDE


Loss of confidence in unit's leadership.

Increasing self-doubt among leaders.

Hesitancy in the employment of supporting combat systems.

Over supervision of units.

Hesitancy in the conduct of night operations.



T221/JAN04/ VGT-12

EFFECTS OF FRATRICIDE, (cont)


Loss of aggressiveness in maneuver (fire and movement).

Loss of initiative.

Disrupted operations.

General degradation of unit cohesiveness, morale, and combat power.





CAUSES OF FRATRICIDE,
(cont)

Failures in reporting and communications.

Weapons errors.

Battlefield hazards.

Reliance on instruments.



T221/JAN04/ VGT-15

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Appendix B Test(s) and Test Solution(s) (N/A)

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Appendix C Practical Exercises and Solutions

This Appendix Contains

This appendix contains the items listed in this table:

Item/Title	Pages
PE-1, Risk Management Assessment	C-1 through C-3
SPE-1, risk Management Assessment	C-4

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PRACTICAL EXERCISE 1

Title Risk Management Assessment

Lesson Number/Title T221 version 1 / Risk Management

Introduction The next 30 minutes of this lesson contains a practical exercise. As a group, you will do a risk assessment of the given situation. You will have 15 minutes to make the assessment and 15 minutes to discuss your assessment in the classroom.

Motivator This practical exercise evaluates your knowledge of the material covered in this lesson. Your ability to identify hazards and recommend controls will assist you in increasing the safety levels in your unit and during unit activities.

Terminal Learning Objective **NOTE:** The instructor should inform the students of the following Terminal Learning Objective covered by this practical exercise.
At the completion of this lesson, you [the student] will:

Action:	Implement the risk management process in order to minimize the frequency and severity of accidents in the activities you lead.
Conditions:	In a classroom environment and in an STX while serving as a leader.
Standards:	<p>Implemented the risk management process in order to minimize the frequency and severity of accidents:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identifying the basic principles for implementing the risk management process. • Identifying the five steps of the risk management process. • Identifying the causes and effects of fratricide. • Conducting a risk assessment for training activities you will lead. <p>IAW FM 100-14 and FM 3-20.98</p>

Safety Requirements None

Risk Assessment Level Low

Environmental Considerations None

Evaluation

This is a non-graded practical exercise.

Instructional Lead-In

This PE requires you to apply the information you learned in this lesson to develop a risk assessment from the given situation.

Resource Requirements**Instructor Materials:**

None

Student Materials:

You will need all the reference material for this lesson.

Special Instructions

None

Procedures

This practical exercise is thirty minutes total.

- This is a group exercise. Select one student from your group to brief your solution.
- You will have 15 minutes to read the situation and prepare a risk assessment using the Risk Management Worksheet, C-3.
- During the second 15 minutes the selected student from each group will brief the groups risk assessment.
- After the briefings the instructor will pass out the solution and ask for questions and comments.

Situation

The event is a squad compass/orienteering competition. Your squad currently holds first place for this event in the company. You have two newly assigned soldiers in your squad. Due to the past 6 weeks of rain, the once dry stream on the course is now a full running stream (6 feet deep). The weather report forecasts a temperature of 30 degrees for the morning of the competition.

RISK MANAGEMENT WORKSHEET

A. Mission or Task:		B. Date/Time Group Begin: End:		C. Date Prepared:	
C. Prepared By: (Rank, Last Name, Duty Position)					
E. Task	F. Identify Hazards	G. Assess Hazards	H. Develop Control	I. Determine Residual Risk	J. Implement Control ("How To")
K. Determine overall mission/task risk level after controls are implemented (circle one)					
LOW (L) MODERATE (M) HIGH (H) EXTREMELY HIGH (E)					

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**SOLUTION FOR
PRACTICAL EXERCISE 1**

RISK MANAGEMENT WORKSHEET

A. Mission or Task: Orienteering Competition		B. Date/Time Group Begin: 010700NOVXX End: 011000NOVXX		C. Date Prepared:	
C. Prepared By: (Rank, Last Name, Duty Position) SGT Smith, Squad Leader					
E. Task	F. Identify Hazards	G. Assess Hazards	H. Develop Control	I. Determine Residual Risk	J. Implement Control ("How To")
Navigate from one point on the ground to another point while dismounted	Inexperienced soldiers	High (H)	Additional instruction and increased supervision	Moderate (M)	Modified training schedule, additional instruction
	Seasonal Risk (Cold weather injuries)	Moderate (M)	Cold weather clothing and equipment; Soldier/leader awareness training	Low (L)	Severe weather alert/action plan
	Water crossing	Extremely High (E)	Additional instruction and increased supervision. Place warning signs.	High (H)	Modified training schedule, additional instruction. Unit SOP
K. Determine overall mission/task risk level after controls are implemented (circle one)					
LOW (L) MODERATE (M) HIGH (H) EXTREMELY HIGH (E)					

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Appendix D HANDOUTS FOR LESSON: T221 version 1

**This Appendix
Contains**

This appendix contains the items listed in this table--

Title/Synopsis	Pages
SH-1, Advance Sheet	SH-1-1
SH-2, Extract from FM 100-14	SH-2-1
SH-3, Extract from FM 3-20.98	SH-3-1

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Student Handout 1

Advance Sheet

Lesson Hours This lesson consists of two hours of small group instruction.

Overview In every mission, there is a fight against two enemies. One is the declared enemy (the threat to national security). The other enemy is human error. Human error watches us, and it waits. It singles out individual soldiers. Soldiering is tough, demanding and risky. It has a high potential for danger and accidents. Soldiering attracts men and women with the "can do" and warfighting spirit. This means we take risks and don't shrink from responsibility. In this lesson we show you how risk management can assist in mission accomplishment.

Learning Objective Terminal Learning Objective (TLO) is:

Action:	Implement the risk management process to minimize the frequency and severity of accidents in the activities you lead.
Conditions:	In a classroom environment and in an STX while serving as a leader.
Standard:	Implemented the risk management process to minimize the frequency and severity of accidents in the activities you lead by: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Identifying the basic principles for implementing the risk management process.• Identifying the five steps of risk management process.• Identifying the causes and effects of fratricide.• Conducting a risk assessment for training activities you will lead. IAW FM 100-14 and FM 17-98.

ELO A Identify the basic principles for implementing the risk management process.

ELO B Identify the five steps of the risk management process.

ELO C Identify the causes and effects of fratricide.

Assignment Before class, read Student Handout 1 (SH-1) and Student Handout 2 (SH-2).

Additional Subject Area Resources None

Bring to Class

- SH-1 and SH-2.
- Pencil or pen and writing paper.

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Student Handout 2

Extracted Material from FM 100-14

This student handout contains 33 pages of extracted material from the following publication:

FM 100-14, Risk Management, 23 Apr 1998

Chapter 1	pages 1-1 thru 1-7
Chapter 2	pages 2-0 thru 2-21
Appendix A	pages A-1 thru A-4

Disclaimer: The training developer downloaded the extracted material from the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library Home Page. The text may contain passive voice, misspellings, grammatical errors, etc., and may not be in compliance with the Army Writing Style Program.

Chapter 1

Risk Management Fundamentals

Sizing up opponents to determine victory, assessing dangers and distances is the proper course of action for military leaders.

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, "Terrain"

Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk costs with mission benefits. Leaders and soldiers at all levels use risk management. It applies to all missions and environments across the wide range of Army operations. Risk management is fundamental in developing confident and competent leaders and units. Proficiency in applying risk management is critical to conserving combat power and resources. Commanders must firmly ground current and future leaders in the critical skills of the five-step risk management process.

Risk is characterized by both the probability and severity of a potential loss that may result from hazards due to the presence of an enemy, an adversary, or some other hazardous condition. Perception of risk varies from person to person. What is risky or dangerous to one person may not be to another. Perception influences leaders' decisions. A publicized event such as a training accident or a relatively minor incident may increase the public's perception of risk for that particular event and time—sometimes to the point of making such risks unacceptable. Failure to effectively manage the risk may make an operation too costly—politically, economically, and in terms of combat power (soldiers lives and equipment). This chapter presents the background, principles, applicability, and constraints relating to the risk management process.

BACKGROUND

Throughout the history of armed conflict, government and military leaders have tried to reckon with the effect of casualties on policy, strategy, and mission accomplishment. Government and military leaders consider battle losses from different perspectives. However, both must balance the following against the value of national objectives:

- Effects of casualties.
- Impact on civilians.
- Damage to the environment.
- Loss of equipment.
- Level of public reaction.

War is inherently complex, dynamic, and fluid. It is characterized by uncertainty, ambiguity, and friction. *Uncertainty* results from unknowns or lack of information. *Ambiguity* is the blurring or fog that makes it difficult to distinguish fact from impression about a situation and the enemy. *Friction* results from change, operational hazards, fatigue, and fears brought on by danger. These characteristics cloud the operating environment; they create risks that affect an army’s ability to fight and win. In uncertainty, ambiguity, and friction, both danger and opportunity exist. Hence, a leader’s ability to adapt and take risks are key traits. Chapter 2 of FM 100-5 provides information on the challenging circumstances of military operations during conflict.

Historically, the Army has had more accidental losses, including fratricide (friendly fire), than losses from enemy action. See Figure 1-1. These accidental losses are the same types experienced in peacetime

Army	World War II 1942–1945	Korea 1950–1953	Vietnam 1965–1972	Desert Shield/ Storm ¹ 1990–1991
Accidents	56%	44%	54%	75%
Friendly Fire	1%	1%	1%	5%
Enemy Action	43%	55%	45%	20%

¹These numbers include the relatively long buildup time and short period of combat action

Figure 1-1. Battle and Nonbattle Casualties

during training exercises. These losses are not caused by the enemy or an adversary. Factors include—

- An ever-changing operational environment.
- Effects of a fast-paced, high-operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and a high-personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) on unit and human performance. Examples include leader or soldier error or failure to train or perform to standards.
- Equipment failure, support failure, and the effects of the physical environment.

PRINCIPLES

The basic principles that provide a framework for implementing the risk management process are—

- *Integrating risk management into mission planning, preparation, and execution.* Leaders and staffs continuously identify hazards and assess both accident and tactical risks. They then develop and coordinate control measures. They determine the level of residual risk for accident hazards in order to evaluate courses of action (COAs). They integrate control measures into staff estimates, operation plans (OPLANS), operation orders (OPORDs), and missions. Commanders assess the areas in which they might take tactical risks. They approve control measures that will reduce risks. Leaders ensure that all soldiers understand and properly execute risk controls. They continuously assess variable hazards and implement risk controls.
- *Making risk decisions at the appropriate level in the chain of command.* The commander should address risk guidance in his commander's guidance. He bases his risk guidance on established Army and other appropriate policies and on his higher commander's direction. He then gives guidance on how much risk he is willing to accept and delegate. Subordinates seek the higher commander's approval to accept risks that might imperil the next higher commander's intent.
- *Accepting no unnecessary risk.* Commanders compare and balance risks against mission expectations and accept risks only if the benefits outweigh the potential costs or losses. Commanders alone decide whether to accept the level of residual risk to accomplish the mission.

APPLICABILITY

Risk management applies to all situations and environments across the wide range of Army operations, activities, and processes. Risk management is useful in developing, fielding, and employing the total Army force. Figure 1-2 summarizes the key aspects of risk management.

DEVELOPMENT

Development concerns include force design, manpower allocation, training and training developments, and combat and materiel developments (equipment and weapons systems) and battle laboratories.

Risk management assists the commander or leader in—

- Conserving lives and resources and avoiding unnecessary risk.
- Making an informed decision to implement a COA.
- Identifying feasible and effective control measures where specific standards do not exist.
- Providing reasonable alternatives for mission accomplishment.

Risk management does not—

- Inhibit the commander's and leader's flexibility and initiative.
- Remove risk altogether, or support a zero defects mindset.
- Require a GO/NO-GO decision.
- Sanction or justify violating the law.
- Remove the necessity for standard drills, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Figure 1-2. Key Aspects of Risk Management

Force Design

Concerns include risks introduced in trade-off decisions that involve the design and equipping of—

- Tables of organization and equipment (TOE).
- Modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE).
- Tables of distribution and allowances (TDA) organizations.

Manpower Allocations

Concerns include shortfalls in manning that put unit readiness and full use of combat system capabilities at risk.

Training and Training Developments

Concerns include hazardous and critical training tasks and feasible risk reduction measures that provide leaders with the flexibility to safely conduct tough, realistic training.

Combat and Materiel Developments and Battle Laboratories

Concerns include providing a means to assist in making informed trade-off decisions such as—

- Balancing equipment form, fit, and function.
- Balancing the durability and cost of equipment and spare parts against their reliability, availability, and maintainability requirements.
- Determining the environmental impact.
- Determining whether to accept systems with less than the full capabilities prescribed in requirement documents and experimental procedures.

ARs 70-1 and 385-16 and MIL-STD-882 provide details on risk management application in the Army materiel acquisition process.

FIELDING

Fielding concerns include personnel assignments, sustainment and logistics, training, and base operations.

Personnel Assignments

Concerns include making informed decisions in assigning replacement personnel. For example, a risk is associated with assigning a multiple launch rocket system crewmember as a replacement for a tube artillery cannon crewmember.

Sustainment and Logistics

Concerns include enhancing one's ability to determine support requirements, the order in which they should be received, and the potential impact of logistics decisions on operations.

Training

Concerns include helping leaders determine the—

- Balance between training realism and unnecessary risks in training.
- Impact of training operations on the environment.
- Level of proficiency and experience of soldiers and leaders.

Base Operations

Concerns include prioritizing the execution of base operations functions to get the most benefit from available resources. Examples include allocating resources for pollution prevention, correcting safety and health hazards, and correcting violations of environmental protection regulations. FM 20-400 provides specific guidance on environmental protection in military operations.

EMPLOYMENT

Employment concerns include force protection and deployment, operations, and redeployment.

Force Protection

Concerns include developing a plan that identifies threats and their associated hazards and balancing resource restraints against the risk.

Deployment, Operations, and Redeployment

Concerns include—

- Analyzing the factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T) to determine both tactical and accident risks and appropriate risk reduction measures.
- Determining the correct units, equipment composition, and sequence.
- Identifying controls essential to safety and environmental protection.

CONSTRAINTS

Risk management does not convey authority to violate the law-of-land warfare or deliberately disobey local, state, national, or host nation laws. It does not justify ignoring regulatory restrictions and applicable standards. Neither does it justify bypassing risk controls required by law, such as life safety and fire protection codes, physical security, transport and disposal of hazardous material and waste, or storage of classified material. Commanders may not use risk management to alter or bypass legislative intent. However, when restrictions imposed by other agencies adversely affect the mission, planners may negotiate a satisfactory COA if the result conforms to the legislative intent.

Risk management assists the commander in complying with regulatory and legal requirements by—

- Identifying applicable legal standards that affect the mission.
- Identifying alternate COAs or alternate standards that meet the intent of the law.
- Ensuring better use of limited resources through establishing priorities to correct known hazardous conditions that will result in projects with the highest return on investment funded first.

Chapter 2

Risk Management Process

First reckon, then risk

Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke

This chapter provides the essence of the five-step risk management process. It illustrates the application of each step to military operations through the factors of METT-T.

THE FIVE STEPS: AN OVERVIEW

Risk management is the process of identifying and controlling hazards to conserve combat power and resources. The five steps of risk management are—

- Step 1. Identify hazards.
- Step 2. Assess hazards to determine risks.
- Step 3. Develop controls and make risk decisions.
- Step 4. Implement controls.
- Step 5. Supervise and evaluate.

This five-step process is integrated into the military decision-making process as shown in Figure 2-1.

FM 100-40 provides insight into the context in which the risk management process is applied herein. Areas of particular interest in FM 100-40 include—

- Solving tactical problems (Chapter 1).
- The science and art of tactics (Chapter 1).
- Hasty versus deliberate operations (Chapter 1).
- The plan-prepare-execute cycle (Chapter 1).
- Basic tactical control measures (Chapter 2).
- The factors of METT-T (Chapter 2).

Military Decision-Making Process	Risk Management Steps				
	Step 1 Identify Hazards	Step 2 Assess Hazards	Step 3 Develop Controls and Make Risk Decision	Step 4 Implement Controls	Step 5 Supervise and Evaluate
Mission Receipt	X				
Mission Analysis	X	X			
COA Development	X	X	X		
COA Analysis	X	X	X		
COA Comparison			X		
COA Approval			X		
Orders Production				X	
Rehearsal ¹	X	X	X	X	X
Execution and Assessment ¹	X	X	X	X	X

¹All boxes are marked to emphasize the continued use of the risk management process throughout the mission

Figure 2-1. Risk Management Steps Correlated with Military Decision-Making Tasks

Risk decisions should be based upon awareness rather than mechanical habit. Leaders should act on a keen appreciation for the essential factors that make each situation unique instead of from conditioned response. Throughout the entire operational continuum, the commander must consider US Government civilians and contract support personnel in his risk management process. Hazards can exist, regardless of enemy or adversary actions, in areas with no direct enemy contact and in areas outside the enemy's or adversary's

influence. The two types of risk that exist across the wide range of Army operations are *tactical risks* and *accident risks*.

- *Tactical risk* is risk concerned with hazards that exist because of the presence of either the enemy or an adversary. It applies to all levels of war and across the spectrum of operations.
- *Accident risk* includes all operational risk considerations other than tactical risk. It includes risks to the friendly force. It also includes risks posed to civilians by an operation, as well as an operations impact on the environment. It can include activities associated with hazards concerning friendly personnel, civilians, equipment readiness, and environmental conditions.

STEPS 1 AND 2

Steps 1 and 2 together comprise the risk assessment. In Step 1, individuals identify the hazards that may be encountered in executing a mission. In Step 2, they determine the direct impact of each hazard on the operation. The risk assessment provides for enhanced situational awareness. This awareness builds confidence and allows soldiers and units to take timely, efficient, and effective protective measures.

STEPS 3 THROUGH 5

Steps 3 through 5 are the essential follow-through actions to effectively manage risk. In these steps, leaders balance risk against costs—political, economic, environmental, and to combat power—and take appropriate actions to eliminate unnecessary risk. During execution, as well as during planning and preparation, leaders continuously assess the risk to the overall mission and to those involved in the task. Finally, leaders and individuals evaluate the effectiveness of controls and provide lessons learned so that others may benefit from the experience.

THE FIVE STEPS APPLIED

STEP 1. IDENTIFY HAZARDS

A *hazard* is an actual or potential condition where the following can occur due to exposure to the hazard:

- Injury, illness, or death of personnel.
- Damage to or loss of equipment and property.
- Mission degradation.

Hazards are sources of danger or risks due to enemy or adversary presence and other conditions not due to enemy or adversary capabilities. Hazards are found in all operational environments. Combat operations, stability operations, base support operations, and training present unique hazards for units involved in these kinds of missions. Hazards are identified during the first four steps of the military decision-making process: *mission receipt*, *mission analysis*, *COA development*, and *COA analysis*.

The ability of unit leaders and staffs to identify hazards is key. One reality of today's missions is that the aspect of a hazard can change rapidly. Things of little risk initially can quickly become major threats due to unforeseen natural or man-made events. Leaders should be aware of this possibility. Complacency to the fact that existing controls may not continue to control hazards in rapidly changing situations should be viewed as a hazard in itself.

The factors of METT-T provide a sound framework for identifying hazards when planning, preparing, and executing operations. When applying risk management to METT-T during mission analysis, leaders and staffs should look for hazards that affect both tactical and accident risks. They must identify all hazards that may present significant risks to the mission.

Mission

Leaders first analyze the assigned mission. They look at the type of mission to be accomplished and consider possible subsequent missions. Certain kinds of operations are inherently more dangerous than others. For example, a deliberate frontal attack, because of the associated movement, is more likely to expose a unit to losses than would a defense from prepared positions. Identifying missions that routinely present great risk is imperative. Leaders also look for hazards associated with complexity of the plan such as—

- A scheme of maneuver that is difficult to understand or too complex for accurate communications down to the lowest level.
- The impact of operating under a fragmentary order (FRAGO).

Enemy

Commanders look for enemy capabilities that pose significant hazards to the operation. For example, "What can the enemy do to

defeat my operation?” Common shortfalls that can create hazards during operations against an enemy include failure to—

- Assess potential advantages to the enemy provided by the battlefield environment.
- Fully assess the enemy’s capabilities.
- Understand enemy collection capabilities and friendly vulnerabilities to those capabilities.
- Accurately determine the enemy’s probable COAs.
- Plan and coordinate active ground and aerial reconnaissance activities.
- Disseminate intelligence about the enemy to lower levels.
- Identifying terrorist threats and capabilities.

Intelligence plays a critical part in identifying hazards associated with tactical risk. Intelligence-preparation-of-the-battlefield (IPB) is a dynamic staff process that continually integrates new information and intelligence that ultimately becomes input to the commander’s risk assessment process. Intelligence assists in identifying hazards during operations by—

- Identifying the opportunities and constraints the battlefield environment offers to threat and friendly forces.
- Thoroughly portraying threat capabilities and vulnerabilities.
- Collecting information on populations, governments, and infrastructures.

FMs 34-130 and 34-60, respectively, provide detailed information on IPB and on counterintelligence operations and multidiscipline counterintelligence analysis.

Terrain and Weather

In addition to those due to the enemy or adversaries, the most obvious hazards to military operations are due to terrain and weather. Terrain and weather affect the type of hazard encountered. When the enemy uses terrain to his advantage, the risk is clearly tactical. The aspects of terrain and weather may create situations where accident risks predominate. When looking at this from a purely mission perspective, familiarity of the unit with the terrain and its associated environment must be paramount. Basic issues include—

- How long the unit has operated in the environment and climate.
- Whether the terrain has been crossed before.

Terrain. The five main military aspects of terrain—*observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain and decisive terrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA)*—can be used to identify and assess hazards impacting on friendly forces. Chapter 2 of FM 100-40 has details on OCOKA. The terrain analysis includes both map and on-the-ground reconnaissance to identify how well unit capabilities and mission demands can be accommodated by the terrain.

- *Observation and fields of fire.* Hazards associated with this usually involve when the enemy will be able to engage a friendly unit and when friendly unit weapons capabilities allow it to effectively engage the enemy.
- *Cover and concealment.* Hazards associated with cover and concealment are created by the enemy's ability to place direct or indirect fire on friendly forces.
- *Obstacles.* Hazards associated with obstacles may be accident or tactical. They may be due to natural conditions such as rivers or swamps or man-made such as minefields or built-up areas.
- *Key terrain and decisive terrain.* Hazards are a marked advantage terrain provides to the enemy if he controls such terrain or denies its use to friendly forces.
- *Avenues of approach.* Hazards associated with avenues of approach can affect both tactical and accident risks. Such hazards include conditions where an avenue of approach impedes deployment of friendly combat power or where it supports deployment of enemy combat power.

Weather. Weather works hand-in-hand with terrain to create hazards. To identify weather hazards, leaders and soldiers must assess the impact on operating systems. Mistakes include not considering the—

- Adverse effects of heat and cold hazards on the performance of soldiers.
- Effects of climate and weather on maintenance of vehicles and equipment before beginning an operation.
- Hazardous effects of weather on the five military aspects of terrain.

Troops

Leaders analyze the capabilities of available friendly troops. Associated hazards impact both the soldier and unit. Key considerations are level of training, manning levels, the condition and maintenance of vehicles and equipment, morale, availability of supplies and services, and the physical and emotional health of soldiers. Leaders and soldiers must be vigilant to the fact that hazards in these areas can adversely affect a mission, even when all tactical considerations point to success. Mission failure can be caused by—

- *Hazards to the physical and emotional health of soldiers.* Inadequate sanitation facilities, water purification capabilities, medical attention, and evacuation capabilities are key hazards that can arise from incomplete logistical planning. Care of troops requires long-range projections of all classes of supply, with close monitoring of mission changes that could impact availability or depletion of supplies. When beginning an operation immediately upon arriving in theater, hazards include not implementing measures to help soldiers overcome fatigue or acclimatize them to the geographical area and associated climate.
- *Hazards to task organization or units participating in an operation.* Hazards include how long units have worked together under a particular command relationship. During stability operations, task organizations may change often. Hazards include poor communication, unfamiliarity with higher headquarters SOPs, and insufficient combat power to accomplish the mission.
- *Hazards associated with long-term missions.* Long-term missions include nation building, peacekeeping, or insurgency/counterinsurgency operations. Hazards associated with these missions include the turmoil of personnel turnover, lack of continuity of leadership, inexperience, and lack of knowledge of the situation and the unit's operating procedures. An especially insidious hazard is critical-skills atrophy that results from not performing METL-related missions.

Time Available

The hazard is insufficient time to plan, prepare, and execute operations. Planning time is always at a premium. Leaders routinely apply the one-third/two-thirds rule to ensure their subordinate units are given maximum time to plan. Failure to accomplish a mission on

time can result in shortages of time for subordinate and adjacent units to accomplish their mission.

Civilians

The commander's legal responsibility is to consider hazards to, and safeguarding of, civilians in his area of operations. *Civilians* include nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), US Government civilians, foreign national civilians, the media, and dislocated civilians put at risk by military operations. The commander must consider hazards that can occur across the range of operations, such as—

- *In a wartime environment.* The commander must consider the hazard of collateral damage which may result in creating new adversaries.
- *In a peacetime environment.* The commander must consider the political attitudes and previous actions of civilians in identifying hazards to friendly forces and the populace itself.

Adversaries are hostile elements other than the enemy that may be encountered during any operation. They present additional hazards. They may be organized opposition or individuals that challenge authority. They may include such diverse elements as rioters, criminals, rogues, or gangs that might want to harass a peace enforcement mission.

STEP 2. ASSESS HAZARDS

Step 2 completes the risk assessment. Risk is the chance of hazard or bad consequences. This step examines each hazard in terms of probability and severity to determine the risk level of one or more hazardous incidents that can result from exposure to the hazard. This step is conducted during three steps of the military decision-making process—*mission analysis*, *COA development*, and *COA analysis*. This step is also conducted after controls are developed.

The incident must be credible in that it must have a reasonable expectation of happening. The end result is an estimate of risk from each hazard and an estimate of the overall risk to the mission caused by hazards that cannot be eliminated. Leaders must also assess the risk to civilians posed by the operation. They may need to assess the operations' impact on the environment. This step is conducted in three substeps.

Substep A

Leaders and staffs assess each hazard in relation to the *probability* of a hazardous incident. The probability levels estimated for each hazard may be based on the mission, COAs being developed and analyzed, or frequency of a similar event. Figure 2-2 provides a summary of the five degrees of probability. The letters in parentheses following each degree (A through E) provide a symbol for depicting probability. For example, the letter *A* represents *frequent* probability.

FREQUENT (A) Occurs very often, continuously experienced	
Single item	Occurs very often in service life. Expected to occur several times over duration of a specific mission or operation. Always occurs.
Fleet or inventory of items	Occurs continuously during a specific mission or operation, or over a service life.
Individual soldier	Occurs very often in career. Expected to occur several times during mission or operation. Always occurs.
All soldiers exposed	Occurs continuously during a specific mission or operation.
LIKELY (B) Occurs several times	
Single item	Occurs several times in service life. Expected to occur during a specific mission or operation.
Fleet or inventory of items	Occurs at a high rate, but experienced intermittently (regular intervals, generally often.).
Individual soldier	Occurs several times in career. Expected to occur during a specific mission or operation.
All soldiers exposed	Occurs at a high rate, but experienced intermittently.
OCCASIONAL (C) Occurs sporadically	
Single item	Occurs some time in service life. May occur about as often as not during a specific mission or operation.
Fleet or inventory of items	Occurs several times in service life.
Individual soldier	Occurs some time in career. May occur during a specific mission or operation, but not often.
All soldiers exposed	Occurs sporadically (irregularly, sparsely, or sometimes).

Figure 2-2. Hazard Probability

SELDOM (D) Remotely possible; could occur at some time	
Single item	Occurs in service life, but only remotely possible. Not expected to occur during a specific mission or operation.
Fleet or inventory of items	Occurs as isolated incidents. Possible to occur some time in service life, but rarely. Usually does not occur.
Individual soldier	Occurs as isolated incident during a career. Remotely possible, but not expected to occur during a specific mission or operation.
All soldiers exposed	Occurs rarely within exposed population as isolated incidents.
UNLIKELY (E) Can assume will not occur, but not impossible	
Single item	Occurrence not impossible, but can assume will almost never occur in service life. Can assume will not occur during a specific mission or operation.
Fleet or inventory of items	Occurs very rarely (almost never or improbable). Incidents may occur over service life.
Individual soldier	Occurrence not impossible, but may assume will not occur in career or during a specific mission or operation.
All soldiers exposed	Occurs very rarely, but not impossible.

Figure 2-2. Hazard Probability (continued)

Substep B

Substep B addresses the *severity* of each hazard. It is expressed in terms of—

- Degree of injury or illness.
- Loss of or damage to equipment or property.
- Environmental damage.
- Other mission-impairing factors such as lost combat power.

The degree of severity estimated for each hazard may be based on knowledge of the results of similar past events. Figure 2-3 provides a summary of the four degrees of hazard severity. The Roman numerals in parentheses following each degree (I through IV) provide a convenient symbol for depicting severity. For example, *I* represents the *catastrophic* degree of severity.

CATASTROPHIC (I)	Loss of ability to accomplish the mission or mission failure. Death or permanent total disability (accident risk). Loss of major or mission-critical system or equipment. Major property (facility) damage. Severe environmental damage. Mission-critical security failure. Unacceptable collateral damage.
CRITICAL (II)	Significantly (severely) degraded mission capability or unit readiness. Permanent partial disability, temporary total disability exceeding 3 months time (accident risk). Extensive (major) damage to equipment or systems. Significant damage to property or the environment. Security failure. Significant collateral damage.
MARGINAL (III)	Degraded mission capability or unit readiness. Minor damage to equipment or systems, property, or the environment. Lost day due to injury or illness not exceeding 3 months (accident risk). Minor damage to property or the environment.
NEGLIGIBLE (IV)	Little or no adverse impact on mission capability. First aid or minor medical treatment (accident risk). Slight equipment or system damage, but fully functional and serviceable. Little or no property or environmental damage.

Figure 2-3. Hazard Severity

Substep C

In this substep leaders and staffs expand what they understand about probable hazardous incidents into estimates of levels of risk for each identified hazard and an estimate of the overall risk for the operation. Estimating risk follows from examining the outcomes of Substeps A and B; that is, both the probability and severity of hazardous incidents. This substep is more art than science. Much depends on the use of historical lessons learned, intuitive analysis,

experience, and judgment. Uncertainty can arise in the assessment of both the probability and severity of a hazardous incident. Uncertainty results from unknowns about a situation; from incomplete, inaccurate, undependable, or contradictory information; and from unforeseen circumstances. Therefore, assessment of risk requires good judgment.

Figure 2-4 is a standardized matrix that can be used to assist in this process. Leaders and staffs enter the estimated degree of severity and probability for each hazard in Substeps A and B from the severity row and probability column, respectively. The point where the severity row and probability column intersect defines the level of risk. For example, if the hazard is estimated to have a *critical* severity (II) and a *likely* probability (B), the level of risk is high (H).

Figure 2-5 provides a summary of the levels of risk. It also provides examples of hazardous incidents for each risk level. Several examples illustrate the trade-off between tactical and accident risks.

Risk Assessment Matrix						
		Probability				
Severity		Frequent A	Likely B	Occasional C	Seldom D	Unlikely E
Catastrophic	I	E	E	H	H	M
Critical	II	E	H	H	M	L
Marginal	III	H	M	M	L	L
Negligible	IV	M	L	L	L	L

E – Extremely High Risk
 H – High Risk
 M – Moderate Risk
 L – Low Risk

Figure 2-4. Risk Assessment Matrix

E - Extremely High: Loss of ability to accomplish the mission if hazards occur during mission. A *frequent* or likely probability of catastrophic loss (IA or IB) or *frequent* probability of *critical* loss (IIA) exists.

Example: A commander finds that one of his implied tasks to attack an objective involves crossing a normally shallow riverbed. After looking at the factors of METT-T, he discovers that three days of intense rain have raised the water level to rise above flood stage, with currents far in excess of his ability to safely ford with armored vehicles. After discussing COAs with his staff, he determines the accident risk is extremely high because of the likely probability and catastrophic severity of losing vehicles and killing soldiers. His conclusions are based on his experience with and knowledge of fording armored vehicles under the existing conditions of water depth and current speed.

H - High: Significant degradation of mission capabilities in terms of the required mission standard, inability to accomplish all parts of the mission, or inability to complete the mission to standard if hazards occur during the mission. *Occasional* to *seldom* probability of catastrophic loss (IC or ID) exists. A *likely* to *occasional* probability exists of a critical loss (IIB or IIC) occurring. *Frequent* probability of *marginal* losses (IIIA) exists.

Example: During a preplanned ambush, the leader discovers that the force he intends to ambush has significantly more combat power than his own force can accommodate. He realizes that he could only delay rather than destroy the enemy. He knows his casualty estimates would be very high if the enemy reorganized and counterattacked. He also knows that the size of the enemy force could seriously impact adjacent units conducting a movement to contact. He determines the situation is *high risk* because he estimates (based on his training and experience) there is a likely probability of the enemy reorganizing and counterattacking and the severity of loss to his unit would be critical.

M - Moderate: Expected degraded mission capabilities in terms of the required mission standard will have a reduced mission capability if hazards occur during mission. An *unlikely* probability of catastrophic loss (IE) exists. The probability of a *critical* loss is *seldom* (IID). *Marginal* losses occur with a *likely* or *occasional* probability (IIIB or IIIC). A *frequent* probability of negligible (IVA) losses exists.

Example: A commander in a defensive position receives a warning order to be prepared to counterattack if the enemy attacks again. He chooses to use pre-positioned ammunition caches to support his defense, as opposed to moving his ammunition resupply forward by truck. He determines that the severity of not having an immediate resupply of ammunition available during the counterattack will have a *critical* impact on his combat power. He realizes that if the enemy forces him to abandon his forward positions, the severity of the loss of his

Figure 2-5. Levels of Risk

ammunition caches will critically impact his combat power. He considers that his unit is deployed in excellent defensive positions. He has repelled two attacks that resulted in the destruction of an estimated 50 percent of the enemy's combat power. He receives information that the probability of the enemy attacking is *likely*, but that the probability of the enemy being reinforced and attacking in overwhelming force is remote (*seldom*). The commander concludes that the risk of conducting a counterattack with limited ammunition is greater than the *moderate* risk of the enemy pushing him back.

L - Low: Expected losses have little or no impact on accomplishing the mission. The probability of *critical* loss is *unlikely* (IIE), while that of *marginal* loss is *seldom* (IIID) or *unlikely* (IIIE). The probability of a *negligible* loss is *likely* or *less* (IVB through (IVE).

Example: A mechanized task force (TF) conducting a movement to contact in a desert environment is overtaken by nightfall before reaching its limit of advance (LOA). The terrain along the axis of advance is flat and open. Visibility is about 800 meters under a clear sky illuminated by a full moon. Estimates put the enemy, which has been hastily withdrawing for the past three days, at approximately 30 percent strength. Contact has been light with no defensible terrain along the TF's axis. The TF commander considers all the factors. In addition, the TF is 100 percent operational in using night vision devices. The TF commander estimates that it is *unlikely* that his unit will incur losses of *critical* severity by being surprised by the enemy or lose *critical* combat power due to an accident. He estimates the risk to his force in continuing a nighttime movement is *low*.

Figure 2-5. Levels of Risk (continued)

STEP 3. DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE RISK DECISIONS

Risk management is the recognition that decision making occurs under conditions of uncertainty. Decisions must remain consistent with the commander's stated intent and offer a good expectation of success. The risk-taking skill requires competency as a prerequisite.

FM 100-7, Decisive Force:
The Army in Theater Operations, May 1995

Step 3 is accomplished in two substeps: develop controls and make risk decisions. This is done during the COA development, COA analysis, COA comparison, and COA approval of the military decision-making process.

Substep A - Develop Controls

After assessing each hazard, leaders develop one or more controls that either eliminate the hazard or reduce the risk (probability and/or

severity) of a hazardous incident. When developing controls, they consider the reason for the hazard not just the hazard itself.

Types of Control Controls can take many forms, but fall into three basic categories—*educational controls*, *physical controls*, and *avoidance*.

- *Educational controls*. These controls are based on the knowledge and skills of the units and individuals. Effective control is implemented through individual and collective training that ensures performance to standard.
- *Physical controls*. These controls may take the form of barriers and guards or signs to warn individuals and units that a hazard exists. Additionally, special controller or oversight personnel responsible for locating specific hazards fall into this category.
- *Avoidance*. These controls are applied when leaders take positive action to prevent contact with an identified hazard.

Criteria for Control To be effective, each control developed must meet the following criteria:

- *Suitability*. It must remove the hazard or mitigate (reduce) the residual risk to an acceptable level.
- *Feasibility*. The unit must have the capability to implement the control.
- *Acceptability*. The benefit gained by implementing the control must justify the cost in resources and time. The assessment of acceptability is largely subjective. Figure 2-6 gives criteria for determining acceptability of controls for each identified hazard.

Support	Availability of adequate personnel, equipment, supplies, and facilities necessary to implement a suitable controls.
Standards	Guidance and procedures for implementing a control are clear, practical, and specific.
Training	Knowledge and skills are adequate to implement a control.
Leadership	Leaders are competent to implement a control.
Individual	Individual soldiers are sufficiently self-disciplined to implement a control.

Figure 2-6. Criteria for Determining Acceptability of Controls

Examples of Controls Examples of controls include—

- Engineering or designing to eliminate or control hazards.
- Selecting a COA that avoids identified hazards.
- Limiting the number of people and the amount of time they are exposed to hazards, consistent with mission requirements.
- Selecting personnel with appropriate mental, emotional, and physical capabilities.
- Providing protective clothing, equipment, and safety and security devices.
- Providing such services as adequate sanitation facilities and water purification capabilities.
- Providing warning signs and signals.
- Scheduling vehicle and aircraft silhouette drills.
- Planning training, including rehearsals, rock drills, battle drills, and so forth.
- Programming communications links for key civilian organizations.
- Establishing battlefield controls such as areas of operations and boundaries, direct fire control measures, fire support coordination measures, rules of engagement, airspace control measures, bridge classification, traffic control, and so forth.
- Developing terrorist attack warning systems and response plans.

The key is to specify who, what, where, when, and how each control is to be used. For example—

- Planning and scheduling intensive threat and friendly vehicle identification refresher training for all antiarmor and air defense weapons crews before the mission reduces the probability of engaging a friendly vehicle or aircraft (fratricide).
- Programming installation of crashworthy passenger seats in the UH-60 Blackhawk, when mission circumstances do not indicate their removal, can reduce the severity of injuries in crashes.
- Requiring soldiers to wear flak vests and helmets during movement to contact, or when riding in vehicles in areas where enemy fire is likely, can reduce the probability and severity of a wound from small arms fire or fragments.

- Establishing strong continuity documents and planning overlap tours for key leaders facilitate smooth transitions during extended operations.

Residual Risk Once the responsible leader develops and accepts controls, he determines the residual risk associated with each hazard and the overall residual risk for the mission.

- *Residual risk* is the risk remaining after controls have been selected for the hazard. Residual risk is valid (true) only if the controls for it are implemented. As controls for hazards are identified and selected, the hazards are reassessed as in Step 2 and the level of risk is then revised. This process is repeated until the level of residual risk is acceptable to the commander or leader or cannot be further reduced. See Figures A-3 through A-5.
- *Overall residual risk* of a mission must be determined when more than one hazard is identified. The residual risk for each of these hazards may have a different level, depending on the assessed probability and severity of the hazardous incident. Overall residual mission risk should be determined based on the incident having the greatest residual risk. Determining overall mission risk by averaging the risks of all hazards is not valid. If one hazard has high risk, the overall residual risk of the mission is high, no matter how many moderate or low risk hazards are present.

Substep B - Make Risk Decision

A key element of the risk decision is determining if the risk is justified. The commander must compare and balance the risk against mission expectations. He alone decides if controls are sufficient and acceptable and whether to accept the resulting residual risk. If he determines the risk level is too high, he directs the development of additional controls or alternate controls, or he modifies, changes, or rejects the COA.

Leaders can use the risk assessment matrix in Figure 2-4—in conjunction with their commanders' guidance—to communicate how much risk they are willing to delegate. For example, a commander may place constraints on his subordinates that restrict their freedom of action to accept risk in instances where the risk might imperil his intent, his higher commander's intent, or a critical capability of the unit.

STEP 4. IMPLEMENT CONTROLS

Leaders and staffs ensure that controls are integrated into SOPs, written and verbal orders, mission briefings, and staff estimates. The critical check for this step, with oversight, is to ensure that controls are converted into clear, simple execution orders understood at all levels. Implementing controls includes coordination and communication with—

- Appropriate superior, adjacent, and subordinate units and those executing the mission.
- Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) organizations and civilian agencies that are part of the force.

The media, NGOs, and PVOs must be included in coordination when their presence impacts or is impacted by the force.

Leaders must explain how supervisors will implement controls. Examples of control implementation include—

- Conducting vehicle and aircraft silhouette drills.
- Conducting rehearsals, rock drills, battle drills, and so forth.
- Conducting intensive threat and friendly vehicle identification refresher training for all antiarmor and air defense weapons crews.
- Conducting orientation for replacement personnel.
- Installing and maintaining communications links for key civilian organizations.
- Operating in convoys of four vehicles minimum.
- Carrying weapons and wearing flak jackets and helmets when outside secure compounds.

STEP 5. SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE

Leaders must supervise the execution of their orders. The more untrained the troops, the more detailed this supervision must be.

Infantry in Battle, 1939

During mission preparation and execution, leaders must ensure that their subordinates understand how to execute risk controls. Leaders continuously assess risks during the conduct of operations,

especially during long-term missions. Leaders maintain situational awareness. They guard against complacency to ensure that risk control standards are not relaxed or violated. To gain insight into areas needing improvement, leaders must continuously evaluate their units' effectiveness in managing mission risks.

Supervise

Leaders supervise mission rehearsal and execution to ensure standards and controls are enforced. Techniques may include spot-checks, inspections, situation reports and brief-backs, buddy checks, and close supervision. During the mission, leaders continuously monitor controls to ensure they remain effective. They modify them as necessary. Leaders and individuals anticipate, identify, and assess new hazards to implement controls. They continually assess variable hazards such as fatigue, equipment serviceability, and the environment. Leaders modify controls to keep risks at an acceptable level.

During sustained operations, leaders continue planning to ensure that controls emplaced at the beginning of the mission apply to changes in the operation's current situation and to hazardous conditions. Leaders must maintain an extraordinary degree of discipline. They must avoid complacency, which can result from boredom and overconfidence. Leaders must ensure that soldiers do not relax their vigilance due to performing repetitive tasks—despite changing roles and missions, unit turbulence and turnover, and declining skills. Leaders maintain a close overwatch on controls put in place to reduce risks over a prolonged period. For example, during stability operations, land mine hazards may not be solved in the near term, but may require continual attention. Other examples of long-term hazards that may be encountered include—

- Climatic extremes.
- NBC and hazardous waste contamination.
- Diseases native to a particular area of operation or indigenous population.
- Terrorist threats.

Evaluate

After a mission, leaders and individuals evaluate how well the risk management process was executed. They—

- Determine how to ensure that successes are continued to the next mission.

- Capture and disseminate lessons learned so that others may benefit from the experience.
- Consider the effectiveness of the risk assessment in identifying and accurately assessing the probability and severity of hazards that resulted in mission degradation.
- Determine whether the level of residual risk of each hazard and of the overall mission were accurately estimated.
- Evaluate the effectiveness of each control in reducing or removing risk, including whether controls were effectively communicated, implemented and enforced.

Leaders and individuals determine why some controls were ineffective and what should be done when the hazard is encountered again. A control may be altered; the way it is implemented or supervised may be changed to make it effective; or a completely different control may be more effective. Leaders must energize the system to fix systemic problems that hinder combat effectiveness.

Figure 2-7 shows that the risk management process continues throughout a mission as well as from mission to mission. It is integral to the military decision-making process. Its application requires good judgment and intuitive analysis borne of confidence, experience, and situational awareness.

TOOLS AND PITFALLS

The appendix provides examples of risk management tools to help leaders assess identified hazards, develop controls, and make risk decisions. The tools should be tailored to suit particular situations and missions. The examples in Figures A-3 through A-5 are tools to manage risk at the tactical level. The example in Figure A-6 is a tool to manage risk at the operational level. Units may develop additional tools suitable for their needs.

Units train to a standard. They operate and train regardless of the degree of real or perceived difficulty. Risk reduction begins with commanders identifying their METLs. Commanders use the risk management process to assess the degree of risk related to each METL their unit must perform. From this assessment, risk reducing standard operating procedures evolve.

Figure A-7 provides an example of risk management considerations integrated into a mission training plan (MTP) task.




Figure 2-7. Continuous Application of Risk Management

Pitfalls arise when risk management tools are used without adaptation to the factors of METT-T. Using a standardized risk assessment card or checklist may be of some value initially in the mission analysis and COA development or in cases where a routine task is performed in an unchanging environment or static situation. However, such a tool used alone will not likely identify all hazards for every mission in a changing operational environment.

Completing the risk assessment alone, but failing to identify effective controls, usually results in a GO or NO-GO decision based on the initial risk. If the risk assessment does not accurately identify the hazards and determine the level of residual risk, the leader is likely to make his risk decision based upon incomplete or inaccurate information. If the risk assessment places missions in a routine, low-risk category, the commander may not be informed of a risk decision resulting in an accepted risk level that could imperil his or his higher commander's intent or other affected organizations. The risk management process is intended to provide reasonable controls to support mission accomplishment without exposing the force to unnecessary residual risk.

Appendix

Examples of Risk Management Application

The examples in this appendix are designed to help those charged with managing risk.

TRACKING TOOL

The work sheet instructions are in Figure A-1.

Work Sheet Instructions	
Block	
A – D	Self explanatory
E	Identify task relating to the mission or task in Block A
F	Identify Hazards – Identify hazards by reviewing METT-T factors for the mission or task. Additional factors include historical lessons learned, experience, judgment, equipment characteristics and warnings, and environmental considerations.
G	Assess Hazards – Assessment includes historical lessons learned, intuitive analyses, experience, judgment, equipment characteristics and warnings, and environmental considerations. Determine initial risk for each hazard by applying risk assessment matrix (Figure 2-4). Enter the risk level for each hazard.
H	Develop Controls – Develop one or more controls for each hazard that will either eliminate the hazard or reduce the risk (probability and/or severity) of a hazardous incident. Specify who, what, where, why, when, and how for each control. Enter controls.
I	Determine Residual Risk – Determine the residual risk for each hazard by applying the risk assessment matrix (Figure 2-4). Enter the residual risk level for each hazard.
J	Implement Controls – Decide how each control will be put into effect or communicated to the personnel who will make it happen (written or verbal instruction; tactical, safety, garrison SOPs, rehearsals). Enter controls.
K	Determine Overall Mission/Task Risk – Select the highest residual risk level and circle it. This becomes the overall mission or task risk level. The commander decides whether the controls are sufficient to accept the level of residual risk. If the risk is too great to continue the mission or task, the commander directs development of additional controls or modifies, changes, or rejects the COA.
	Supervise and Evaluate – This last step is not on the worksheet. Plan how each control will be monitored for implementation (continuous supervision, spot-checks) and reassess hazards as the situation changes. Determine if the controls worked and if they can be improved. Pass on lessons learned.

Figure A-1. Risk Management Work Sheet Instructions

The work sheet (Figure A-2) provides a starting point to logically track the process of hazards and risks. It can be used to document risk management steps taken during planning, preparation, and execution of training and combat missions and tasks.

A. Mission or Task:		B. Date/Time Group Begin: End:		C. Date Prepared:	
D. Prepared By: (Rank, Last Name, Duty Position)					
E. Task	F. Identify Hazards	G. Assess Hazards	H. Develop Controls	I. Determine Residual Risk	J. Implement Controls ("How To")
K. Determine overall mission/task risk level after controls are implemented (circle one)					
LOW (L)		MODERATE (M)		HIGH (H) EXTREMELY HIGH (E)	

Figure A-2. Sample Risk Management Work Sheet

Examples provided in Figures A-3 through A-6 should help individuals manage risk at the tactical level.

A. Mission or Task: Prepare defensive positions		B. Date/Time Group Begin: 010035R May XX End: 010600R May XX		C. Date Prepared: 29 April XX	
D. Prepared By: (Rank, Last Name, Duty Position) LT Jones, Plt Ldr					
E. Task	F. Identify Hazards	G. Assess Hazards	H. Develop Controls	I. Determine Residual Risk	J. Implement Controls ("How To")
Construct nonstandard antivehicular wire obstacle	Back injuries and wire cuts during material offload	Moderate (M)	Use proper lift and carry methods and wear concertina wire gloves and safety goggles	Low (L)	Unit TACSOP, ARTEP 5-145 DRILL (pg 2-44)
	Blunt trauma and cuts in pounding of U-shaped pickets	Moderate (M)	Wear helmet and increase situational awareness	Low (L)	Unit TACSOP, ARTEP 5-145 DRILL (pg 2-44)
	Cuts when unrolling concertina	Moderate (M)	Wear concertina wire gloves and maintain situational awareness	Low (L)	Unit TACSOP, ARTEP 5-335-11-MTP (pg 2-44)
	Cuts when installing concertina	Moderate (M)	Wear concertina wire gloves and maintain situational awareness	Low (L)	Unit TACSOP, ARTEP 5-145 DRILL (pg 2-44)
	Cuts when installing barbed wire	Moderate (M)	Wear concertina wire gloves and maintain situational awareness	Low (L)	Unit TACSOP, ARTEP 5-335-11-MTP (pg 2-44)
K. Determine overall mission/task risk level after controls are implemented (circle one)					
LOW (L) MODERATE (M) HIGH (H) EXTREMELY HIGH (E)					

Figure A-3. Example of Completed Risk Management Work Sheet for Squad/Platoon

A. Mission or Task: Conduct a deliberate attack		B. Date/Time Group Begin: 010035R May XX End: 010600R May XX		C. Date Prepared: 29 April XX	
D. Prepared By: (Rank, Last Name, Duty Position) CPT William Wallace, Cdr					
E. Task	F. Identify Hazards	G. Assess Hazards	H. Develop Controls	I. Determine Residual Risk	J. Implement Controls ("How To")
Conduct obstacle breaching operations	Obstacles	High (H)	Develop and use obstacle reduction plan	Low (L)	Unit TACSOP, OPORD, training handbook
	Inexperienced soldiers	High (H)	Additional instruction and increased supervision	Moderate (M)	Modified training schedule, additional instruction
	Operating under limited visibility	Moderate (M)	Use NVDs; use IR markers on vehicles	Low (L)	Unit TACSOP, OPORD
	Steep cliffs	High (H)	Rehearse use of climbing ropes	Moderate (M)	FM 90-6, <i>Mountain Operations</i> TC 90-6-1, <i>Mountaineering</i>
	Insufficient planning time	High (H)	Plan and prepare concurrently	Moderate (M)	OPORD, troop-leading procedures
K. Determine overall mission/task risk level after controls are implemented (circle one)					
LOW (L) MODERATE (M) HIGH (H) EXTREMELY HIGH (E)					

Figure A-4. Example of Completed Risk Management Work Sheet for Company/Team

Student Handout 3

Extracted Material from FM 3-20.98

This student handout contains nine pages of extracted material from the following publication:

FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, 02 Dec 2002

Appendix I pages I-1 thru I-9

Disclaimer: The training developer downloaded the extracted material from the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library Home Page. The text may contain passive voice, misspellings, grammatical errors, etc., and may not be in compliance with the Army Writing Style Program.

1 **Appendix I**

3 **Fratricide Prevention**

5 Fratricide is defined as
7 the employment of
9 friendly weapons that
11 results in the unforeseen
13 and unintentional death
15 or injury of friendly
17 personnel or damage to
19 friendly equipment.
21 Fratricide prevention is
23 the commander's
25 responsibility. He is
27 assisted by all leaders
29 across all operating
31 systems in accomplishing
33 this mission. This
35 appendix focuses on
37 actions the reconnais-
39 sance platoon leader and
41 his subordinate leaders
43 can take with current
45 resources to reduce the
47 risk of fratricide.

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48
49
50 **SECTION I – GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS**

51 I-1. The underlying principle of fratricide prevention is simple:
52 Leaders who know where their soldiers are, and where they want them to
53 fire, can keep those soldiers alive to kill the threat. At the same time,
54 leaders must avoid at all costs any reluctance to employ, integrate, and
55 synchronize all required operating systems at the critical time and place.
56 They must avoid becoming tentative out of fear of fratricide; rather, they
57 strive to eliminate fratricide risk through tough, realistic, combined arms
58 training in which each soldier and unit achieves the established standard.

59
60 **THE RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON'S FRATRICIDE RISK**

61 I-2. More than any other maneuver element, the reconnaissance
62 platoon is at risk of being the victim of fratricide. The platoon is
63 particularly vulnerable because it often maneuvers in dispersed elements
64 forward and to the flanks of other friendly combat forces. In a battalion,
65 company teams often do not keep up with the plan or with the disposition

1 of the reconnaissance platoon. For these reasons, situational awareness
2 on the part of all reconnaissance leaders, particularly the platoon leader,
3 is critical not only to mission success but also to survival.

4 I-3. In any tactical situation, it is critical that all scouts know where
5 other friendly elements are operating. With this knowledge, they must
6 anticipate dangerous conditions and take steps to either avoid or mitigate
7 them. The platoon leader must always be vigilant of changes and
8 developments in the situation that may place his elements in danger. He
9 must also ensure that all section or squad positions are constantly
10 reported to higher headquarters so that all other friendly elements are
11 aware of where the scouts are and what they are doing. At troop level,
12 NFAs can be designated to control friendly direct and indirect fire into
13 areas in which the platoon is or will be operating. When the platoon
14 leader perceives a potential fratricide situation, he must personally use
15 the higher net to coordinate directly with the friendly element involved.

16 **ROLE OF TRAINING IN FRATRICIDE PREVENTION**

17 I-4. Training allows units and soldiers to make mistakes, with the
18 goal of reducing or eliminating the risk of errors occurring in combat. A
19 key role of the reconnaissance platoon training program is to teach vehicle
20 crews what targets to engage and when to engage them. Just as
21 important, crews must learn and practice restraint in what and when to
22 engage; for example, every vehicle commander must know that he must
23 confirm the target as hostile before issuing and executing any fire
24 command.

25 I-5. Eliminating the risk of fratricide is no less critical as a training
26 standard than are other mission requirements. All leaders must know all
27 aspects of the applicable training standard, including fratricide
28 prevention, and then ensure that their soldiers train to that standard.

30 **SECTION II – EFFECTS OF FRATRICIDE**

31 I-6. Fratricide results in unacceptable losses and increases the risk of
32 mission failure; it almost always affects the unit's ability to survive and
33 function. Units experiencing fratricide suffer these consequences:

- 34 • Loss of confidence in the unit's leadership.
- 35 • Increasing self-doubt among leaders.
- 36 • Hesitancy in the employment of supporting combat systems.
- 37 • Oversupervision of units.
- 38 • Hesitancy in the conduct of night operations.
- 39 • Loss of aggressiveness in maneuver (fire and movement).
- 40 • Loss of initiative.
- 41 • Disrupted operations.
- 42 • General degradation of unit cohesiveness, morale, and combat
43 power.
- 44

SECTION III – CAUSES OF FRATRICIDE

I-7. The following discussion covers the primary causes of fratricide. Leaders must identify any of the factors that may affect their units and then strive to eliminate or correct them.

FAILURES IN THE DIRECT FIRE CONTROL PLAN

I-8. These occur when units do not develop effective fire control plans, particularly in the offense. Units may fail to designate target engagement areas or adhere to target priorities, or they may position their weapons incorrectly. Under such conditions, fire discipline often breaks down upon contact.

I-9. The reconnaissance platoon can use a number of techniques and procedures to help prevent such incidents. An example is “staking in” vehicle and individual positions in the defense, using pickets to indicate the left and right limits of each position. An area of particular concern is the additional planning that must go into operations requiring close coordination between mounted elements and infantry squads. For example, because of the danger posed by discarding petals, sabot rounds should be fired over friendly infantry elements only in extreme emergencies.

LAND NAVIGATION FAILURES

I-10. Units often stray out of assigned sectors, report wrong locations, and become disoriented. Much less frequently, they employ fire support weapons from the wrong locations. In either type of situation, units that unexpectedly encounter an errant unit may fire their weapons at the friendly force.

FAILURES IN COMBAT IDENTIFICATION

I-11. Vehicle commanders and gunners cannot accurately identify thermal or optical signatures near the maximum range of their systems. In limited visibility, units within that range may mistake one another for a threat target.

INADEQUATE CONTROL MEASURES

I-12. Units may fail to disseminate the minimum necessary maneuver fire control measures and fire support coordination measures; they may also fail to tie control measures to recognizable terrain or events. As the battle develops, the plan then cannot address obvious branches and sequels as they occur. When this happens, synchronization fails.

FAILURES IN REPORTING AND COMMUNICATIONS

I-13. Units at all levels may fail to generate timely, accurate, and complete reports as locations and tactical situations change. This distorts

1 the tactical “picture” available at each level and can lead to erroneous
2 clearance of supporting fires.

4 **WEAPONS ERRORS**

5 I-14. Lapses in individual discipline can result in fratricide. These
6 incidents include charge errors, accidental discharges, mistakes with
7 explosives and hand grenades, and use of incorrect gun data.

9 **BATTLEFIELD HAZARDS**

10 I-15. A variety of explosive devices and materiel may create danger on
11 the battlefield: unexploded ordnance; unmarked or unrecorded
12 minefields, including scatterable mines; booby traps. Failure to mark,
13 record, remove, or otherwise anticipate these threats will lead to
14 casualties.

16 **RELIANCE ON INSTRUMENTS**

17 I-16. A unit that relies too heavily on systems such the FBCB2 and
18 GPS devices will find its capabilities severely degraded if these systems
19 fail. The unit will be unable to maintain situational awareness. To
20 prevent potential dangers when system failure occurs, the reconnaissance
21 platoon leader must ensure that his he and his scouts use a balance of
22 technology and traditional basic soldier skills in observation, navigation,
23 and other critical activities.

25 **SECTION IV – FRATRICIDE RISK ASSESSMENT**

26 I-17. Figure I-1 is a worksheet for evaluating fratricide risk in the
27 context of mission requirements. The worksheet lists six mission-
28 accomplishment factors that affect the risk of fratricide, along with
29 related considerations for each factor. Leaders should assess the potential
30 risk in each area (low, medium, or high) and assign a point value to each
31 (one point for low risk, two for medium risk, three for high risk). They
32 then add the point values to calculate the overall fratricide assessment
33 score.

34 I-18. The resulting score is used only as a guide, however. The leader’s
35 final assessment must be based both on observable risk factors, such as
36 those listed on the worksheet, and on his “feel” for the intangible factors
37 affecting the operation. Note that descriptive terms are listed only in the
38 low- and high-risk columns of the worksheet. The assessment of each
39 factor will determine whether the risk matches one of these extremes or
40 lies somewhere between them as a medium risk.

1

	Potential risk categories (with variable conditions and point values)		
Factors affecting fratricide	Low risk (1 point)	Medium risk (2 points)	High risk (3 points)
UNDERSTANDING OF THE PLAN			
Commander's intent	Clear		Vague
Complexity	Simple		Complex
Threat situation	Known		Unknown
Friendly situation	Clear		Unclear
ROE/ROI	Clear		Unclear
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS			
Intervisibility	Favorable		Unfavorable
Obscuration	Clear		Obscured
Battle tempo	Slow		Fast
Positive target ID	100 %		None (0 %)
CONTROL MEASURES			
Command relationships	Organic		Joint/combined
Audio communications	Loud / clear		Jammed
Visual communications	Easily seen		Obscured
Graphics	Standard		Not understood
SOPs	Standard		Not used
Liaison personnel	Proficient		Untrained
Location/navigation	Sure		Unsure
EQUIPMENT (compared to US equipment)			
Friendly	Similar		Different
Threat	Different		Similar
TRAINING			
Individual proficiency	MOS-qualified		Untrained
Unit proficiency	Trained		Untrained
Rehearsals	Realistic		None
Habitual relationships	Yes		No
Endurance	Alert		Fatigued
PLANNING TIME (based on 1/3 - 2/3 rule)			
Higher headquarters	Adequate		Inadequate
Own unit	Adequate		Inadequate
Subordinate elements	Adequate		Inadequate
Overall risk assessment (by total point value)	Low risk 26 - 46 points	Medium risk 42 - 62 points	High risk 58 - 78 points
NOTE: Point values alone may not accurately reflect fratricide risk. The commander must tailor his assessment to the unit's requirements.			

2

Figure I-1. Fratricide Risk Assessment Worksheet

3

SECTION V – FRATRICIDE PREVENTION MEASURES

SPECIAL NOTE

In many situations, the primary cause of fratricide is the lack of positive target identification. To prevent fratricide incidents, commanders and leaders at all levels must ensure positive target identification before they issue commands to fire. In addition, all units must accurately report their locations during combat operations, and all TOCs and CPs must carefully track the location of all subordinate elements in relation to all friendly forces.

I-19. The measures outlined in this section, including those listed in the special note above, provide the platoon with a guide to actions it can take to reduce and/or prevent fratricide risk. These guidelines are not directive in nature, nor are they intended to restrict initiative. Commanders and leaders must learn to apply them as appropriate based on the specific situation and METT-TC factors.

PRINCIPLES OF FRATRICIDE PREVENTION

I-20. At the heart of fratricide reduction and prevention are five key principles.

IDENTIFY AND ASSESS POTENTIAL FRATRICIDE RISKS IN THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

I-21. Express these risks in the OPORD and/or applicable FRAGOs.

MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

I-22. Focus on such areas as current intelligence; unit locations and/or dispositions; denial areas (minefields/scatterable mines); contaminated areas, such as ICM and NBC; SITREPs; and METT-TC factors. FBCB2 will provide the reconnaissance platoon with a distinct advantage in situational awareness.

ENSURE POSITIVE TARGET IDENTIFICATION

I-23. Review vehicle and weapons identification (ID) cards. Become familiar with the characteristics of potential friendly and threat vehicles, including silhouettes and thermal signatures. Learn the conditions, including distance (range) and weather, under which positive identification of various vehicles and weapons is possible. Enforce the use of challenge and password, especially during dismounted operations. (NOTE: Refer to the special note earlier in this discussion.)

MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE FIRE CONTROL

I-24. Ensure fire commands are accurate, concise, and clearly stated. Make it mandatory for crewmen to ask for clarification of any portion of the fire command they do not completely understand. Stress the importance of the chain of command in the fire control process; ensure

1 crewmen get in the habit of obtaining target confirmation and permission
2 to fire from their leaders before engaging targets they assume are threat
3 elements. Know who will be in and around the area of operations.

4 **ESTABLISH A COMMAND CLIMATE THAT EMPHASIZES FRATRICIDE**
5 **PREVENTION**

6 I-25. Enforce fratricide prevention measures, placing special emphasis
7 on the use of doctrinally sound TTP. Ensure constant supervision in the
8 execution of orders and in the performance of all tasks and missions to
9 standard.

10
11 **ADDITIONAL GUIDELINES**

12 I-26. Additional guidelines and considerations fratricide reduction and
13 prevention include the following:

- 14 • Recognize the signs of battlefield stress. Maintain unit
15 cohesion by taking quick, effective action to alleviate stress.
- 16 • Conduct individual, leader, and collective (unit) training
17 covering fratricide awareness, target identification and
18 recognition, and fire discipline.
- 19 • Develop a simple, decisive plan.
- 20 • Strive to provide maximum planning time for leaders and
21 subordinates.
- 22 • Give complete and concise mission orders. Include all
23 appropriate recognition signals in paragraph 5 of the OPORD.
- 24 • To simplify mission orders, use SOPs that are consistent with
25 doctrine. Periodically review and update SOPs as needed.
- 26 • Use common language/vocabulary and doctrinally correct
27 standard terminology and control measures, such as the
28 FSCL, zone of engagement, and RFL.
- 29 • Ensure thorough coordination is conducted at all levels.
- 30 • Plan for and establish effective communications.
- 31 • Plan for collocation of CPs whenever it is appropriate to the
32 mission, such as during a passage of lines.
- 33 • Designate and employ LOs as appropriate.
- 34 • Make sure ROE are clear.
- 35 • Conduct rehearsals whenever the situation allows the platoon
36 adequate time to do so.
- 37 • Be in the right place at the right time. Use position
38 location/navigation devices (GPS and POSNAV); know your
39 location and the locations of adjacent units (left, right,
40 leading, and follow-on); and synchronize tactical movement. If
41 the platoon or any element becomes lost or misoriented,
42 leaders must know how to contact higher headquarters
43 immediately for instructions and assistance.
- 44 • Establish, execute, and enforce strict sleep and rest plans.
- 45 • Include a discussion of fratricide incidents in all AARs.
- 46

SECTION VI – STOPPING A FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

I-27. The reconnaissance platoon may become involved in a friendly fire incident in one of several ways: as the victim of the fire; as the firing element; or as an observer intervening in an attack of one friendly element on another. This section covers actions that leaders and crewmen must be prepared to take when they encounter such situations.

ACTIONS AS VICTIM OF FRIENDLY FIRE

I-28. The following are recommended actions at crew and leader level in the event the crew falls victim to friendly fires:

- React to contact until you recognize friendly fire.
- Cease-fire.
- Take immediate actions to protect soldiers and vehicles.
- Use a visual recognition signal directing the firing unit to cease fire.
- Report the following on the next higher unit net:
 - Announce that you are receiving friendly fire.
 - Request medical assistance as needed.
 - Give the location and direction of the firing vehicles.
 - Warn the higher unit not to return fire if you identify the firing unit as friendly.

ACTIONS AS FIRING ELEMENT

I-29. The following are recommended actions at crew and leader level when the crew has engaged friendly forces:

- Cease-fire.
- Report the following on the next higher net:
 - Identification of the engaged friendly force (if the unit is unidentified, report number and type of vehicles).
 - The location of the incident.
 - Direction and distance to the engaged force.
 - The type of fire.
 - The target effects.

ACTIONS AS OBSERVER OF FRIENDLY FIRE

I-30. The following are recommended actions at crew and leader level in the event the crew observes a friendly fire incident:

- Seek cover and protect yourself.
- Use a visual recognition signal directing the firing unit to cease-fire.

- 1 • Report the following on the next higher net:
 - 2 ■ Identification of the engaged friendly force (if the unit is
 - 3 unidentified, report number and type of vehicles).
 - 4 ■ The location of the incident.
 - 5 ■ Direction and distance to the victim and the firing unit.
 - 6 ■ The type of fire.
 - 7 ■ The target effects.
- 8 • Provide assistance as needed (when it is safe to do so).
- 9

10 **LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES**

11 I-31. In all situations involving the risk of fratricide and friendly fire,
12 leaders must be prepared to take immediate actions to prevent casualties
13 as well as equipment damage or destruction. Recommended actions in
14 fratricide situations include the following:

- 15 • Identify the incident and order the parties involved to cease-
16 fire.
- 17 • Conduct an in-stride risk assessment.
- 18 • Identify and implement controls to prevent the incident from
19 recurring.