

## Enclosure 1 (Operational Environment Changes) to TRADOC FY 04 Command Training Guidance

1. **General.** The purpose of this enclosure is to provide an overview of the elements of the contemporary operational environment, so that Commandants can consider and integrate, as appropriate, the impacts of the environment into U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) training and education. TRADOC faces two different but related contemporary operational environments (COE). One portion of the COE is the environment that TRADOC must operate in on a day-to-day basis. The other portion of the COE is the environment that we must portray in training events to drive desired leader development and unit training outcomes. The environment that challenges TRADOC is a radically different, fluid environment that affects our mission and drives the need to change TRADOC and how it does business in support of the Army. The COE that drives training outcomes is more than a different opposing force (OPFOR) at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). It involves the careful integration of a number of environmental variables with the activities of an OPFOR to produce a complex network of interacting elements in a tactical setting. These two environments affect how we train and educate our soldiers and leaders.

2. **TRADOC's Operating Environment.** The environment TRADOC faces in executing the command's core missions and the changes by our potential adversaries are captured in the following:

- Operations tempo (OPTEMPO) is higher than it has ever been; time available remains unchanged. Senior leaders must discipline the number of events our organizations try to accomplish. Staff and faculty must focus on disciplining the number of tasks we try to do—ensure we have time to plan, prepare, execute to standard, assess, and feed back the results into our training and education.
- Homeland defense is a new mission. Offense, defense, stability operations, support operations (ODSS) are still primary missions in homeland defense, but conditions are quite different from what we are accustomed.
- Resources—people, land, and money—have diminished.
- We increasingly conduct combined arms at company level. Company commanders require additional training to understand combined arms with many assets. This also applies to our Advanced Noncommissioned Officer (NCO), Battle Staff NCO, and First Sergeant courses ([ANCOC](#), [BSNCOC](#), and [FSC](#)). The threat is less predictable and less templatable.
- FM 6-0, *Mission Command and Command and Control of Army Forces*, requires a very specific approach to command and control in the objective force, that is, mission command—the empowering of small unit leaders to conduct decentralized operations. Begin teaching now the next generation of Army leaders to enable and empower their subordinates with clear statements of intent and avoidance of micromanagement and over supervision. Start with pre-command courses, both at the Branch Proponent and Fort Leavenworth, then U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), followed by our captains' training. Our CTCs must also embrace the

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concept of mission command. Observer controllers must understand the doctrine, look for it during unit operations, and make it a part of their after-action reports (AARs).

- Objective Force qualities are needed in today's soldiers, leaders, and units. Leaders must have the range of operational experiences, as well as the tactical and technical expertise, to lead a force optimized for the entire range of military missions.

- On 1 Mar 02, the office of the Secretary of Defense ([OSD](#)), in a watershed event, published the *Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training*. The three strategic goals of the plan are to: (1) broaden the joint focus, joint training and education, and link to readiness assessment, (2) build an integrated Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) Training Environment, and (3) revise acquisition and other supporting processes to ensure training requirements are considered in the process. The impact on the Army is completely positive. Some potential impacts could include:

- United States Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA) adapting its battle staff course ([BSNCOC](#)) to train and educate noncommissioned officers not only from the Army, but sister services and allied nations, in battle staff functions for joint, multinational, intergovernmental, and interagency operations. Make this a part of the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) transformation analysis.

- CGSC's Department of Joint and Multinational Operations (DJMO) and the [School for Advanced Military Studies](#) (SAMS) maintaining continuous dialogue with the [Battle Command Training Program](#) (BCTP) to incorporate relevant lessons learned from their work with divisions, corps, and the Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs).

- The Chairman [Joint Chiefs of Staff](#) (CJCS), working with the [National Defense University](#) (NDU), United States [Joint Forces Command](#) (USJFCOM), Services, and senior service colleges (SSC), develops a core curriculum for joint military leader development and begins distributing these educational courses on line.

- Establishing a joint national training capability (JNTC), giving commanders the tools to regularly train troops from multiple services across the globe, using live-fire ranges networked with training simulators and augmented by computer-generated "synthetic forces." JFCOM has much of the responsibility for the Pentagon's objective of achieving JNTC initial operational capability by Oct 04.

- Joint training at the brigade level—intergovernmental, interagency, and multinational operations, as well as the traditional multiservice concept of joint.

- Today, to a large degree, we cannot go to war, enforce peace agreements, participate in humanitarian missions, conduct joint exercises, or deal effectively with terrorism, without calling upon the National Guard and Reserve. Your curricula must serve the active and reserve components; delivery methods may differ within each course; however, ensure the content, quality, and the standards are common for all components. Involve yourself in training and supporting your reserve components.

- New technologies allow us to train differently:

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- Simulations will help us train more realistically and mitigate resource constraints. Instead of focusing on conducting live training, complement live training with virtual and constructive simulations to enable realistic training over a virtual/constructive extended battle space using fewer resources. Simulations allow us to:

- + Fire weapons we may not be able to afford to fire live.
- + Conduct iterative training to develop intuition in leaders.
- + Ensure we do not use soldiers as training aids.
- + Correct mistakes.
- + Train equipment operation and maintenance without the requirement to purchase the equipment for training.

- Embedded training capabilities will allow soldiers to train individually and as a combined arms team in a LVC training environment on realistic virtual battlegrounds—without leaving the motor pool.

- Knowledge reach-back, a “pull” system, provides instant, current, relevant knowledge to the field, allowing us to adjust what must be taught in the classroom versus what we must have available on the web, on demand, for units in the field. We must also develop our reach-forward (“push”) capabilities to provide training, lessons learned; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); knowledge; education; doctrine; and other products to the field as they become available.

- In the past, we relied heavily on our schools and units to provide a knowledge base to soldiers and leaders. That reliance is still there, but now soldiers and leaders must do a better job of self-development. The operational environment changes so quickly that the value of classroom and unit experience can have a short half-life. Soldiers must have the knowledge of how to and the means to access current, relevant knowledge on demand to help them succeed in their current job, as well as expand their base of general knowledge.

- We are striving to develop technologies that will allow us to tighten the link between doctrine and school programs of instruction with lessons, insights, and observations of TTP. Currently, we update doctrine according to a timeline. Now we must be able to change it whenever necessary and make it immediately available to users on the web. We must, and this is most important, be able to collect, analyze, and disseminate lessons, insights, observations, and TTP from units in theater to both units getting ready to deploy to the theater and to students in the classrooms.

- Technology, even simple information technology such as e-mail, allows us to change how we gather assessment and feedback from the field. In the past, units waited on the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) to come to them to gather lessons and insights. CALL and TRADOC do not have the resources to continue that practice in a fast-paced operational environment. Change our culture to one where units, soldiers, and leaders proactively feed lessons to CALL, so that they can be quickly analyzed and disseminated throughout the Army as required. Witness the impact on the Army and soldiers of MSG Romero’s e-mail after his return from

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Afghanistan (*Wall Street Journal*, February 7, 2003, “How One Soldier’s E-Mail Changed Troops Equipment”).

- The joint operational concept has changed.

**Joint Operational Concept**

Now	Transformed
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <u>Estimate-Based Planning</u> - <i>Ad hoc</i> command and control, threat-based template for prediction of enemy actions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <u>See First</u> - Joint C4ISR network; Common Relevant Operating Picture; data fusion</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <u>Move to Contact</u> - Rigid sequential decision making; published orders; intelligence by contact</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <u>Understand First</u> - Battle Command; situational understanding; decision aids; collaborative planning; self-aware, adaptive leaders</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <u>Develop the Situation</u> - Make contact then develop the situation; centralized decision making; standard operating procedures; stovepiped systems</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <u>Act First</u> - Develop the situation out of contact; decentralized decision making; translate information dominance to decision superiority</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <u>Close With and Destroy</u> - Overwhelming physical mass; attrition based; sequential contiguous operations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <u>Finish Decisively</u> - Precision maneuver and fires to engage out of contact; close when necessary; exploiting initiative</li> </ul>

3. **COE Training Environment.** The recent events in Iraq have graphically demonstrated the elements of the COE. Our challenge is to continue to integrate these elements into training events. The following elements characterize the COE and need to be integrated into training and leader development activities.

a. Threat.

- Potential adversaries continue to learn and adapt to U.S. operations. Not all of the enemies we may face subscribe to the accepted rules of warfare or the U.S. value system. When this fact is combined with the myriad of other factors that affect combat operations, leaders, and units will be faced with a battlefield that calls for more than simple doctrinal solutions to tactical dilemmas.

- Expect continued integration of paramilitary and even nonmilitary combat forces into threat operations to confound U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and precision weapons.

- Complex terrain, both urban and natural, will continue to be the battlefield of choice for our adversaries. The close fight—soldier-on-soldier—negates the U.S. advantage of standoff fires.

- Bad weather provides threat forces unique opportunities as U.S. ISR is hampered. Training exercises should include periods of inclement weather and the subsequent reduction in U.S. ISR capability. No place in the world provides the perfect weather often reflected in exercise scenarios.

- Although the outcome of the war in Iraq may change world perceptions, the current perception by our adversaries is that the U.S. is not willing to sustain casualties. This perception guides the adversaries’ preparation of the battlefield to face the U.S.

- The reflection of U.S. values as demonstrated in our Rules of Engagement

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(ROE) provides a potential vulnerability that an enemy could exploit. Training events need to have realistic and enforced ROE to prevent the perpetuation of erroneous lessons about how the U.S. will fight.

- Expect future threat forces to have some technologies that equal or exceed U.S. capability. While these technologies may not be widely distributed throughout a threat force they pose a real challenge to an unprepared U.S. leader or unit. Technological surprise in some circumstances may unhinge a U.S. plan. The current proliferation of night vision devices provides an excellent example of the U.S. precarious ownership of the night.

### b. U.S. Army.

- Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) are deliberative thought processes designed to assist commanders and staff in choosing viable courses of action. We must intuitively streamline them to affect execution-centric ISR in the COE. This supports adaptive leaders who can clearly define their information requirements, synthesize understanding of the situation from information ISR provides, and act decisively to maintain dominant situational understanding.

- We are simultaneously conducting stability operations, support operations, homeland defense, preparing for war, and transforming our force and force structure. We must balance readiness with transformation. Both affect the way we train and develop soldiers and leaders. As we transform, we will have forces with different capabilities operating together.

- Advances in battle command technology and battle command concepts coupled with increasing range, lethality, and precision of weapons will cause us to train differently because we will fight differently.

- All soldiers must be capable of conducting combat operations in ODSS operations—no more secure rear areas, no more front lines. We must inculcate a warrior ethos in every soldier. As a starting point, pending the update of FM 22-100, review the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Phase II (NCO) Final Report findings, conclusions, and recommendations regarding warrior ethos.

- Special Operations Forces (SOF) and conventional forces are operating much more as a team now rather than as separate forces. Both need a better understanding of how the other works and can complement each other's capabilities and missions.

- Skills needed for full-spectrum operations are not that different between what is needed for war and operations other than war. Common leader skills include the MDMP, IPB, troop-leading procedures (TLP), and precombat inspections (PCIs). Many of the principles in the targeting process can be applied to information operations (decide, detect, deliver, assess). However, knowledge and attitudes are different. In stability operations and support operations, leaders must know much more about a

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country—politics, issues, leaders, etc., and must learn how to deal with civilians and their different force protection issues. Leaders’ attitudes must reflect patience and perseverance rather than quick conflict resolutions

- The increase in joint, multinational, interagency, and intergovernmental operations require us to train our leaders in those operations earlier in their careers. We must train leaders to learn the capabilities and methods of employment of the other services, agencies, state and local governments, and multinational forces.

- We must be prepared to operate in a wide range of complex environments. Exercise scenarios must reflect widely varying and complex mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC).

- Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR).

- We can see the enemy before he sees us, understand his disposition of forces and intent better, and act with decisive force before he can. Soldiers and leaders have that common operating picture. This permits junior leaders to take the initiative on the battlefield without waiting for permission to act while complying with the commander’s overall intent. Our training must require junior leaders to practice decision making based on intelligence provided during the execution of training, not what was developed during IPB. We must develop execution—not planning and preparation—centric leaders.

- Technology has significantly compressed sensor to shooter time—the time required to detect, assess, and deliver effects. This ability—to add velocity (the ability to think and move quicker than a foe) to data—is the most dramatic improvement in our military over the past decade. It underlies overwhelming advances in the speed and accuracy with which forces can bring lethal and nonlethal weapons systems to bear. Leaders use the technology to gain advantage in velocity—measured not just in the speed of tanks, but also in the speed of leaders thinking and planning. Our precision-strike capabilities represent the 20th century’s third “revolution in military affairs,” where emerging technologies and new warfighting concepts change the nature of war.

Revolution	Time	Technologies and Warfighting Concepts
First	1917 1939	Internal combustion engines improved aircraft design, radio and radar produced German blitzkrieg, carrier aviation, and strategic aerial bombardment.
Second	1945	End of World War II, with the advent of nuclear weapons.
Third	1990	Precision strikes, information dominance, near-real time targeting, U.S. military leads to the way from Industrial Age warfare to Information Age operations.

- Commanders and staffs must be proficient in the timeless arts of tactical command and staff analysis, and staff interaction and orders development/transmission

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using automated C4ISR digital systems. Commanders and staff must know how to intuitively interface with C4ISR displays and radio communications systems to quickly obtain only relevant tactical and logistical information available from massive and continually changing C4ISR and logistic databases.

- Technology is providing us with mission planning and rehearsal (MPRE) systems. Leaders can rehearse the operation in simulation in multiple ways by changing key variables. Contrast this with our current practice of a one-time walk-through on a sand table or in a rock drill. In the classroom, simulations will allow leaders to do more than just develop a plan; simulations will allow them to fight the plan to help them see how good or bad their plan was. Leaders can further develop their intuition by fighting the plan iteratively, changing variables with each iteration. In the information age, we must develop leaders who can instinctively, quickly, and confidently recognize the right course of action to take when faced with a situation.

- The ambiguous, rapid, and constant nature of change of the operational environment requires self-aware and adaptive Army leaders, units, and organizations. Our training and education must develop these competencies—understanding the operational environment, assessing one's own capabilities, determining one's strengths and weaknesses, and actively learning to overcome those weaknesses. We must learn to recognize changes in our operating environment, identify those changes, and learn how to adapt to succeed in new environments. Our organizations must demonstrate characteristics of learning organizations (Enclosure 5) and have processes, programs, and systems that enable them to facilitate rapid change